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MEDICAL NECESSITY: A HIGHER HURDLE
FOR MARGINALIZED TAXPAYERS?
Julie Furr Youngman & Courtney D. Hauck
Civil rights protection for transgender people—and in particular
access to affordable health care—is currently the subject of intense
political scrutiny, with a hostile administration chipping away at legal
protections. Among other setbacks, a federal district court enjoined
regulatory guidelines that were issued in 2016 to clarify that the
federal prohibition on sex discrimination in health insurance applies
to discrimination on the basis of gender identity and transgender
status, and the promulgating agency itself is now reconsidering the
guidelines. Without explicit federal protections against discrimination
by health insurers and in the face of uneven state law protections, the
ability to deduct costs associated with gender transition-related health
care that are not covered by insurance on one’s personal income taxes
has taken on new significance for the transgender population. This
article takes a new look at the 2010 decision of the United States Tax
Court in O’Donnabhain v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, in
which the Court held that a transgender taxpayer could deduct certain
transition-related medical expenses on her federal income tax return,
but not others. This article argues that, while the O’Donnabhain
decision may legitimize transition-related treatments as medically
appropriate in the insurance context, the Court overreached by
considering whether the costs at issue were “medically necessary”
and “widely accepted” in the medical community, requirements that
the federal tax code does not impose. In so doing, the decision risks
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imposing an unwarranted burden of proof on transgender people and
potentially on other marginalized populations. This article explores
the implications of the O’Donnabhain decision for transgender health
care in the current political and legal climate, and explores strategies
to protect health care rights for transgender people and other
marginalized communities, with a focus on the medical deduction for
individual federal income taxes.
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INTRODUCTION
The topic of civil rights protection for transgender people is
currently the subject of intense scrutiny from all sides, from politics to
academia to the nation’s courts. In particular, the cost of transgender
health care, as well as the availability and scope of insurance coverage
to pay for it, has become a topic of greater focus at both the federal
and state level. The most recent developments, however, aim to make
the process of obtaining and affording health care more burdensome
for transgender individuals rather than less so.
In December 2017, the Trump administration banned the Center
for Disease Control and Prevention from using the term “transgender”
in its 2018 budget documents.1 Prior to that, in the summer of 2017,
President Trump cited the allegedly high cost of transgender health
care as a reason for banning transgender people from serving in the
U.S. military; in the same order, he banned “the use of [Department of
Defense] and [Department of Homeland Security] resources to fund
sex-reassignment surgical procedures for military personnel.”2 In
March 2017, the U.S. Census Bureau reversed plans to collect data on
transgender individuals in the upcoming 2020 Census, which would
have provided important information on such matters as uninsured
rates and lack of access to health care among transgender populations.3
And, with the farthest reaching effects of all, Obama-era guidelines
published by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
(“HHS”) in May 2016, which clarified that a federal prohibition on
sex discrimination in health insurance includes discrimination on the
basis of gender identity and transgender status, were undermined by
two events: in December 2016, in litigation challenging the guidelines
on religious grounds, a federal court enjoined their implementation,
and then in July 2017 HHS itself secured a stay of the litigation while
it reassesses the guidelines and considers amending them.4 The
1. Juliet Eilperin & Lena H. Sun, CDC Gets List of Forbidden Words: Fetus, Transgender,
Diversity, WASH. POST (Dec. 15, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/healthscience/cdc-gets-list-of-forbidden-words-fetus-transgender-diversity/2017/12/15/f503837a-e1cf11e7-89e8-edec16379010_story.html?utm_term=.45a3636767ea (other banned terms include:
“science-based,” “evidence-based,” “diversity,” and “vulnerable”).
2. See Presidential Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Homeland
Security, 82 Fed. Reg. 41319 (Aug. 25, 2017) (banning transgender participation in the U.S. armed
forces); see also Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Trump Surprises Military with a Transgender Ban, N.Y.
TIMES, July 27, 2017, at A1.
3. See infra notes 50–55 and accompanying text.
4. See infra Section II(A).
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prevalence of an antagonistic attitude in the current administration, as
evidenced by these events, coupled with the lack of explicit
enforceable statutory protections for transgender health care at both
the state and federal levels of government, poses challenges for
transgender people seeking affordable health care.
Typically, many Americans can look to their health insurance
(whether provided by Medicare or Medicaid programs, or by private
health insurers) to pay for the medical care they need, and many can
deduct any remaining health care costs that are not covered by
insurance from their income on their individual federal income tax
returns using the medical deduction as a means of offsetting some of
the burden of those out-of-pocket expenses. Likewise, transgender
people may seek both insurance coverage and income tax deductions
for the cost of their transition-related care, which may include
psychotherapy, hormone therapy, gender conformity surgery, 5 and
other surgeries. The availability of the former (insurance coverage)
may be limited to those treatments that are deemed “medically
necessary,” depending upon the governing laws in the patient’s home
state and on the terms of his or her insurance policy. The Internal
Revenue Code, however, does not apply a “medical necessity”
requirement to the latter (the income tax deduction for medical care)
so long as a deducted expense meets the Code’s definition of medical
care, discussed in more detail below.6 The Internal Revenue Service
and the Tax Court has not generally questioned whether particular
medical treatments, even non-traditional and non-mainstream
treatments, are “medically necessary” or even widely accepted before
allowing deductions, so long as the taxpayer and his or her health care
provider believe the treatment would aid in diagnosing, curing,
alleviating, or treating a disease or medical condition.7 Yet a recent
decision of the United States Tax Court appears to import a “medical
necessity” threshold for transgender people seeking to use the medical
deduction for transition-related medical expenses, unjustifiably and
disproportionately disadvantaging this already marginalized group.
5. Gender conformity surgery is also sometimes called Gender Affirmation Surgery, Gender
Confirmation Surgery, Sex Reassignment Surgery (SRS), or Gender Reassignment Surgery (GRS).
Glossary of Gender and Transgender Terms, THE FENWAY INST., http://fenwayhealth.org/docume
nts/the-fenway-institute/handouts/Handout_7-C_Glossary_of_Gender_and_Transgender_Terms
_fi.pdf (last updated Apr. 8, 2018).
6. I.R.C. § 213(d) (2017).
7. See infra text accompanying notes 262–63.
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Admittedly, the United States Tax Court’s 2010 decision in
O’Donnabhain v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue8 creates
precedent allowing transgender people to deduct certain transitionrelated medical expenses such as hormone therapy and gender
conformity surgery on their federal income tax returns, representing a
significant but preliminary step on the way to legitimizing such
expenses as deductible, medically appropriate, and insurable in other
contexts. Yet the O’Donnabhain Court may have gone too far by
unnecessarily addressing whether the treatments were “widely
accepted” and whether the costs at issue were “medically necessary,”
requirements that the federal tax code does not impose, instead of
simply answering the question actually mandated by applicable tax
regulations: whether the treatments at issue met the definition of
deductible “medical care” without being ruled out by the exception for
“cosmetic surgery.”9 The holding may be helpful to transgender
people seeking coverage of transition-related treatments in the
insurance context. But by applying the higher—and unfounded—
standard of “medical necessity” in the tax context, the Court
unnecessarily inserted itself into the political debate over the
appropriateness of various treatments for transgender patients. It
thereby imposed a gratuitous hurdle that, if taken as more authoritative
than the dicta that it is, may be used to harm taxpayers—both those
who are transgender and those who are not—in the future by
preventing them from deducting the cost of legitimate but uninsured
medical care from their taxes simply because the decision-maker—
whether an Internal Revenue agent or future Tax Court panel—finds
the treatment to be experimental or non-traditional, or is otherwise not
persuaded of its absolute necessity and wide acceptance. In light of the
recent events described above, a fresh look at the O’Donnabhain
decision is in order.
This Article describes the current climate for transgender health
care and coverage and explores strategies to protect health care rights
for transgender people and other marginalized communities, with a
focus on the medical deduction for individual federal income taxes.
Part I describes the widely-accepted best practices for transgender
health care and identifies challenges to obtaining that care in the

8. 134 T.C. 34 (2010).
9. I.R.C. § 213(d) (2017).
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United States. Part II analyzes current federal and state regulations
governing transgender health care and their implications for
transgender people living in different states. Part III explains the
federal tax deduction for medical expenses and its application to
gender transition-related care. Part IV discusses the Tax Court’s
decision in O’Donnabhain v. Commissioner as it relates to these issues
and questions some of its reasoning and conclusions. Finally, Part V
explores the implications of the ruling for transgender health care in
the context of current federal and state legislation and guidance,
including considerations for legal, political, and medical professionals
seeking to protect the interests of transgender people and other
marginalized populations.
I. TRANSGENDER MEDICAL NEEDS AND CHALLENGES
A. Transgender People Face High Rates of Illness and Poverty
Studies show that transgender populations experience a wide
range of minority stressors at higher rates than the population at large.
Before delving into the specifics, clarification of the current
understanding of the term “transgender” may be useful. According to
the American Psychological Association (“APA”), the term
“transgender” refers to the state of “having a gender identity that
differs from one’s sex assigned at birth,”10 while the American
Psychiatric Association defines it as “the broad spectrum of
individuals who transiently or persistently identify with a gender
different from their gender at birth.”11 Notably, being transgender does
not necessarily mean that one wishes to transition (change one’s
gender role)12 or undergo gender conformity surgery; rather,
“transgender” is “an umbrella term for persons whose gender identity,
gender expression [such as dress] or behavior does not conform to that
typically associated with the sex to which they were assigned at
birth.”13 This includes individuals “who identify with binary gender
10. The Psychology of Transgender: Eight Questions for Transgender Expert Walter
Bockting, PhD, AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N (Nov. 19, 2015), http://www.apa.org/news/press/releases/
2015/11/psychology-transgender.aspx.
11. What is Gender Dysphoria?, AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, https://www.psychiatry.org/pati
ents-families/gender-dysphoria/what-is-gender-dysphoria (last visited Feb. 18, 2018).
12. The Psychology of Transgender: Eight Questions for Transgender Expert Walter
Bockting, PhD, supra note 10.
13. Transgender People, Gender Identity and Gender Expression, AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N,
http://www.apa.org/topics/lgbt/transgender.aspx (last visited Feb. 18, 2018).
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identities (e.g., trans men, trans women) and/or nonbinary gender
identities (e.g., gender-queer, gender-bender, gender-fluid, agender,
bigender).”14 An estimated 1.4 million transgender people live in the
United States today.15 Those individuals face numerous challenges,
not the least of which is that they are statistically more likely than the
adult population at large to experience poverty, as well as a wide range
of mental and physical health issues, and to encounter obstacles in
obtaining treatment for those issues.
According to transgender psychology expert Dr. Walter
Bockting, “[h]ealth disparities in the area of mental health are well
documented among this population. Transgender people are more
vulnerable to symptoms of depression and anxiety, which is at least in
part attributable to the social stress they experience as members of a
gender minority population.”16 Even in the population in general,
studies show that stigma and discrimination subject an individual to
feelings of loneliness, isolation, hopelessness, and depression, all of
which are factors associated with suicide; thus, the stigma and
discrimination associated with being transgender can magnify suicide
rates among transgender populations in particular.17 According to one
study, among transgender people surveyed, “41% of respondents
reported attempting suicide compared to 1.6% of the general
population;”18 another source estimates that “[54%] of transgender
youth have attempted suicide and 21% resort to self-mutilation.”19

14. Elliot A. Tebbe & Bonnie Moradi, Suicide Risk in Trans Populations: An Application of
Minority Stress Theory, 63 J. COUNSELING PSYCHOL. 520, 520 (2016).
15. Jan Hoffman, Estimate of U.S. Transgender Population Doubles to 1.4 Million Adults,
N.Y. TIMES (June 30, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/01/health/transgender-population.
html?_r=0. This estimate came from a survey asking people whether they considered themselves
to be transgender, with interviewers being instructed to define the term transgender as someone
who “experience[s] a different gender identity from their sex at birth.” Andrew R. Flores et al.,
How Many Adults Identify as Transgender in the United States?, THE WILLIAMS INST. 3, 7 (June
2016), http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/How-Many-Adults-Identify-asTransgender-in-the-United-States.pdf.
16. The Psychology of Transgender: Eight Questions for Transgender Expert Walter
Bockting, PhD, supra note 10.
17. Tebbe & Moradi, supra note 14, at 520–33.
18. See Jaime M. Grant et al., Injustice at Every Turn: A Report of the National Transgender
Discrimination Survey, NAT’L GAY AND LESBIAN TASK FORCE 72 (2011), http://www.thetask
force.org/static_html/downloads/reports/reports/ntds_full.pdf; see also Tebbe & Moradi, supra
note 14, at 520 (“Estimated lifetime prevalence of suicide attempts in trans populations ranges from
26% to 45% . . . .”).
19. AM. COLL. OF OBSTETRICS AND GYNECOLOGY, COMMITTEE OPINION NO. 512: HEALTH
CARE FOR TRANSGENDER INDIVIDUALS 118 (2011) (hereinafter “ACOG Policy”).
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A study of transgender people in the San Francisco area illustrates
the incidence and effects of stigma and discrimination on that
population: Among the sample, “59% of participants reported
experiencing rape, 36% reported physical victimization . . . , 83%
reported verbal discrimination . . . , and 62% reported other forms of
discrimination (e.g., being fired, evicted or denied housing, denied
access to health care services) as a result of gender identity.”20
Significantly, the study noted that “participants’ experiences of rape
and each of the forms of gender identity-based discrimination were
associated positively with attempted suicide.”21 In addition,
transgender people experience high rates of depression and substance
abuse, two general risk factors for suicide in the general population.
The lifetime prevalence of depression in transgender populations is
estimated to exceed 50%, compared to 16% in the general
population.22 Further, “approximately 17% of trans women and 33%
of trans men reported past alcohol problems” compared to World
Health Organization estimates of “1.9% for women and 5.5% for
men . . . in the United States.”23 Both minority stressors and increased
rates of depression and substance abuse result in “individual
differences in depression and suicide risk in transgender
populations.”24
Additionally, the stigma associated with the transgender
population often makes it difficult for transgender people to access
resources such as education, health care, employment, and housing.25
These issues are compounded by, and potentially contribute to, high
rates of poverty among transgender Americans. Transgender
Americans are between three and four times more likely to have a
household income under $10,000 per year than the population as a
whole, and 34% of African American transgender people reported
incomes at this level compared to 9% of all African Americans.26
20. Tebbe & Moradi, supra note 14, at 521.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 521-22.
23. Id. at 522.
24. Id. at 530.
25. HIV Among Transgender People, CENTERS FOR DISEASE AND CONTROL PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/hiv/group/gender/transgender/index.html (last updated Aug. 3, 2017)
(hereinafter “CDC HIV Among Transgender Webpage”).
26. Paying an Unfair Price: The Financial Penalty for Being Transgender in America,
MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT (2015), http://www.lgbtmap.org/file/paying-an-unfairprice-transgender.pdf.
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Finally, transgender people face additional challenges due to
heightened rates of physical illnesses such as HIV and AIDS.
According to the Center for Disease Control:
Multiple factors have put transgender people at risk for HIV
infection and transmission, including multiple sexual
partners, anal or vaginal sex without condoms or medicines
to prevent HIV, injecting hormones or drugs with shared
syringes and other drug paraphernalia, commercial sex work,
mental health issues, incarceration, homelessness,
unemployment, and high levels of substance misuse
compared to the general population, as well as violence and
lack of family support.27
This heightened incidence of HIV/AIDS in the transgender
community is compounded by race: while the transgender population
experiences HIV/AIDS at four times the rate of the general U.S.
population,28 about “half of transgender people diagnosed with HIV
are black/African American.”29 Accordingly, increased access to
compassionate and comprehensive mental and physical health care is
necessary to prevent, detect, and treat these and other health care
issues afflicting a disproportionate percentage of the transgender
community.30
B. Transition-Related Care as Treatment for Gender Dysphoria
A subset of transgender people suffers from a related diagnosable
emotional disorder that involves significant psychological distress and
discomfort with one’s assigned sex. This condition was known as
gender identity disorder (“GID”) under the fourth edition of the
authoritative Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
(“DSM-IV”) and is now called gender dysphoria in the recentlypublished fifth edition (hereinafter “DSM-5”). The DSM-5 renamed
the condition to acknowledge that, while transgender status is not itself
a psychological disorder, the significant and pervasive psychological
distress and discomfort that sometimes accompany one’s assigned sex

27. HIV Among Transgender People, supra note 25.
28. JAIME M. GRANT ET AL., NATIONAL TRANSGENDER DISCRIMINATION SURVEY REPORT
ON HEALTH AND HEALTH CARE 13 (National Gay and Lesbian Task Force 2010).
29. HIV Among Transgender People, supra note 25.
30. Id.
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can be.31 The DSM-5 defines gender dysphoria as a diagnosis that
involves “a difference between one’s experienced/expressed gender
and assigned gender” together with “significant distress or problems
functioning” related to that dissonance.32 The American Medical
Association (“AMA”) and other medical care organizations have
recognized GID as described in the DSM-IV (and now gender
dysphoria, as described in the DSM-5) as a “serious medical
condition.”33 Left untreated, gender dysphoria can result in “clinically
significant psychological distress, dysfunction, debilitating depression
and, for some people without access to appropriate medical care and
treatment, suicidality and death.”34
The World Professional Association for Transgender Health
(“WPATH”) is the leading professional organization devoted to the
understanding and treatment of gender dysphoria.35 WPATH’s
internationally accepted Standards of Care for the Health of
Transsexual, Transgender, and Gender Nonconforming People
(hereinafter “WPATH Standards of Care” or “Standards of Care”)
provide guidance on step-by-step treatment for gender dysphoria.36
These steps typically begin with psychotherapy and other mental
health care provided by a licensed psychotherapist or other health care
professional.37 They continue with various types of support for
“[c]hanges in gender expression and role,”38 such as change of name,
dress, hair, voice and communication style.39 In some cases, next steps
may include, when appropriate, “hormone therapy to feminize or
masculinize the body”40 and/or gender conformity surgery (that is,
31. Wayne Parry, Gender Dysphoria: DSM-5 Reflects Shift in Perspective on Gender Identity,
THE HUFFINGTON POST (June 4, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/04/genderdysphoria-dsm-5_n_3385287.html.
32. What is Gender Dysphoria?, supra note 11 (emphasis added).
33. AM. MED. ASS’N HOUSE OF DELEGATES, RESOLUTION 122 (A-08) REMOVING FINANCIAL
BARRIERS TO CARE FOR TRANSGENDER PATIENTS (2008), http://www.tgender.net/taw/ama_resol
utions.pdf.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. WORLD PROF’L ASS’N FOR TRANSGENDER HEALTH, STANDARDS OF CARE FOR THE
HEALTH OF TRANSSEXUAL, TRANSGENDER, AND GENDER NONCOMFORMING PEOPLE 9–10, 21–
63 (7th ed. 2011), https://s3.amazonaws.com/amo_hub_content/Association140/files/Standards%2
0of%20Care%20V7%20-%202011%20WPATH%20(2)(1).pdf.
37. Id. at 10, 21–33.
38. Id. at 9. These changes “may involve living part time or full time in another gender role,
consistent with one’s identity”. Id. at 52–54.
39. Id. at 9.
40. Id.
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“[s]urgery to change primary and/or secondary sex characteristics”).41
The Standards of Care require the recommendation of one or more
licensed psychotherapists depending on the type of surgery (one
psychotherapist’s recommendation for “breast/chest surgery” and two
for “genital surgery,” for instance).42
The Standards of Care and their underlying principles are now
recognized by major medical associations such as the AMA, APA, and
American College of Obstetrics and Gynecology (“ACOG”).
Specifically, the AMA issued the following policy statement:
Our AMA (1) recognizes that medical and surgical
treatments for gender dysphoria, as determined by shared
decision making between the patient and physician, are
medically necessary as outlined by generally-accepted
standards of medical and surgical practice; and (2) will
advocate for federal, state, and local policies to provide
medically necessary care for gender dysphoria.43
Likewise, the APA issued a resolution in which it acknowledged the
WPATH Standards of Care and stated both that it “supports the
provision of adequate and necessary mental and medical health care
treatment for transgender and gender variant individuals” and that it
“recognizes the efficacy, benefit and medical necessity of gender
transition treatments for appropriately evaluated individuals and calls
upon public and private insurers to cover these medically necessary
treatments.”44 In a third example of such policy language, the ACOG
acknowledged the wide use of the WPATH Standards of Care,
described the steps of the Standards of Care in detail, and stated,
“[O]bstetrician-gynecologists should be prepared to assist or refer
transgender individuals for routine treatment and screening as well as
hormonal and surgical therapies.”45 The ACOG went on to urge
“public and private health insurance plans to cover the treatment of
gender identity disorder.”46
41. Id. at 10, 54–64.
42. Id. at 27, 59–60.
43. Clarification of Medical Necessity for Treatment of Gender Dysphoria H-185.927, AM.
MED. ASS’N, https://policysearch.ama-assn.org/policyfinder/detail/gender%20dysphoria?uri=%2F
AMADoc%2FHOD-185.927.xml (last updated 2016) (hereinafter “AMA Policy”).
44. Transgender, Gender Identity, & Gender Expression Non-Discrimination, AM. PSYCHOL.
ASS’N, http://www.apa.org/about/policy/transgender.aspx (last visited Feb. 18, 2018).
45. ACOG Policy, supra note 19, at 1455–56.
46. Id. at 1455.
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In all three of the foregoing policies, prominent medical
organizations have (a) recognized the medical propriety and necessity,
in line with physician recommendations and generally accepted care
practices, of treatments for gender dysphoria, and (b) advocated for
federal, state, and local policies to ensure coverage of such health care
under both public and private insurance. Notably, the AMA and
ACOG language specifically points to surgery (i.e., gender conformity
surgery) as an appropriate path to treatment, and the APA and ACOG
specifically acknowledge the WPATH Standards of Care.47 However,
despite near-universal acceptance in the medical community of gender
dysphoria as a formal diagnosis and of the WPATH Standards of Care
as the appropriate treatment for gender dysphoria, transgender people
often experience difficulty receiving appropriate medical care,
obtaining the psychotherapy, hormone treatment, and surgery they
need, and/or securing insurance coverage for the care they do receive.
C. Discrimination and Lack of Awareness as
Obstacles to Accessing Adequate Medical Care
The difficulties that transgender people encounter accessing
appropriate medical care stem from a number of factors. Transgender
and gender-nonconforming survey participants report “very high
levels of postponing medical care when they are sick or injured due to
discrimination (28%) or inability to afford [care] (48%).”48 Twentyeight percent reported being subjected to harassment in medical
settings,49 and according to a 2015 survey, “[o]ne in four (25%)
respondents experienced a problem in the past year with their
insurance related to being transgender, such as being denied coverage
for care related to gender transition or being denied coverage for
routine care because they were transgender.”50
Because the U.S. Census Bureau has never collected data
regarding transgender status or other matters related to gender identity
and has canceled preliminary plans to do so in the 2020 census,
independent studies such as those cited in this paper are the primary
47. See AMA Policy, supra note 43; ACOG Policy, supra note 19; Transgender, Gender
Identity, & Gender Expression Non-Discrimination, supra note 44.
48. Grant, supra note 28, at 1.
49. Id.
50. Sandy E. James et al., The Report of the 2015 U.S. Transgender Survey, NAT’L CTR. FOR
TRANSGENDER EQUALITY (Dec. 2016), https://transequality.org/sites/default/files/docs/usts/USTS
-Full-Report-Dec17.pdf.
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sources of statistical information regarding transgender and gender
nonconforming people.51 Despite the fact that “more than 75 members
of Congress” and various federal agencies requested that data on
“sexual orientation and gender identity” be collected, the then-director
of the Census Bureau, John Thompson, wrote in March 2017 that the
Bureau had “concluded there was no federal data need” for such
information.52 Significantly, in its report entitled, “Subjects Planned
for the 2020 Census and American Community Survey,” the Bureau
revealed that, even as it rejected suggestions to collect information
about gender identity, it planned to continue to seek information about
gender.53 It stated, “A question about the gender of each person is used
to create statistics about males and females and to present other data,
such as occupation, by gender,” and clarified that the only two choices
for “gender” would be “male” or “female.”54 It went on to explain the
purpose of collecting male/female data:
Gender data are used in planning and funding government
programs and in evaluating other government programs and
policies to ensure they fairly and equitably serve the needs of
males and females. These statistics are also used to enforce
laws, regulations, and policies against discrimination in
government programs and in society.
...
Knowing the gender of people in the community in
combination with information about housing, voting,
51. See Hansi L. Wang, Collecting LGBT Census Data is ‘Essential’ to Federal Agency,
Document Shows, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (June 20, 2017), https://www.npr.org/2017/06/20/53354201
4/collecting-lgbt-census-data-is-essential-to-federal-agency-document-shows; see also Stephen
Dinan, President Trump Cancels Sexual Orientation Questions on 2020 Census, WASH. TIMES
(Mar. 28, 2017), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/mar/28/trump-cancels-censussexual-orientation-questions-/?utmsource=RSS_Feedutm_medium=RSS
(“The Trump administration canceled plans to probe Americans for their sexual orientation in the
2020 Census, nixing efforts by congressional Democrats who’d wanted a better picture of the
country’s increasingly complex family and sexual dynamics.”).
52. John W. Thompson, Director’s Blog: Planned Subjects for the 2020 Census and the
American Community Survey, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU: CENSUS BLOGS (Mar. 29, 2017),
https://www.census.gov/newsroom/blogs/director/2017/03/planned_subjects_2020.html
(defending decision to remove gender identity and sexual orientation from list of 2020 Census
topics).
53. U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, SUBJECTS PLANNED FOR THE 2020 CENSUS AND AMERICAN
COMMUNITY SURVEY: FEDERAL LEGISLATIVE AND PROGRAM USES 9 (Mar. 2017),
https://www2.census.gov/library/publications/decennial/2020/operations/planned-subjects-2020acs.pdf.
54. Id.
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language, employment, and education, helps government and
communities enforce laws, regulations, and policies against
discrimination on the basis of gender.
...
Knowing whether people of different genders have the same
opportunities in education, employment, voting, home
ownership, and many other areas is of interest to researchers,
advocacy groups, and policymakers. For example, . . .
several agencies use gender data to investigate whether
women, including women who are military veterans, have
similar employment opportunities as men.55
The same report identified numerous other areas of inquiry, including
“health insurance,” and explained the purpose of that line of inquiry:
Knowing the health insurance coverage status of people in a
community helps planners identify gaps in community
services, plan programs that address those gaps, and qualify
for funding for those programs.
Knowing more about changes in health insurance coverage
rates and the characteristics of people who have or do not
have health insurance is also of interest to researchers,
advocacy groups, and policymakers.56
Gathering the same types of information about gender identity would
serve the same commendable purposes for the transgender population,
and it would provide similar valuable information about whether
transgender individuals are being “fairly and equitably” treated—or
discriminated against—in a variety of spheres, such as employment,
health insurance, and access to medical care. Yet, as of March 2017,
the U.S. Census Bureau had determined not to collect data on the
American transgender population and its specific needs.57
Although data on the difficulties experienced by the transgender
population in accessing health care is limited, anecdotally, at least
some cases of health care denial stem from a lack of training and
awareness related to transgender medical care among the medical
community, leaving many physicians unaware of, for instance, the
need for pap smears, breast exams, mammograms, and prostate
55. Id. at 9 (emphasis added).
56. Id. at 33.
57. Id.; Thompson, supra note 52.
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screenings in transgender women.58 Specifically, half of transgender
patients surveyed “reported having to teach their medical providers
about transgender [health] care.”59 Accordingly, anti-discrimination
protections and adequate education regarding proper treatment of
transgender patients would improve the availability and quality of
transition- and wellness-related care for transgender people, as would
financial safeguards.60 As stated above, up to half of transgender
people report inability to afford health care as a primary reason for
postponing medical care.61 Thus, from a purely financial perspective,
equity in both health care insurance coverage and tax deductibility for
transgender health care costs would help ensure that adequate health
care is also affordable for transgender patients.
II. FEDERAL AND STATE REGULATIONS GOVERNING TRANSGENDER
HEALTH CARE
Health care affordability is a common obstacle to health care
among transgender people. Specifically, in two different studies,
thirty-three percent62 and forty-eight percent63 of transgender patients
reported delaying or foregoing medical treatment due to their inability
to afford care. One major reason for this lack of affordability is high
out-of-pocket costs that are not covered by insurance.64 About twenty
percent of all transgender people (and more than thirty percent of
African American transgender people) do not have health insurance at
all,65 as compared to 8.8% in the population at large.66 Figures 1, 2,
and 3 show the respective percentages of transgender men, women,
and African-Americans who are privately insured, publicly insured,
and uninsured.
58. Abby Ellin, Transgender Patients Face Challenges at the Hospital, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 16,
2016, 2:59 AM), https://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2016/02/16/for-transgender-patients-challengesat-the-hospital.
59. Grant, supra note 28, at 1.
60. Id.; Ellin, supra note 58.
61. Grant, supra note 28, at 1.
62. James, supra note 50, at 8.
63. Grant, supra note 28, at 1.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 8.
66. JESSICA C. BARNETT & EDWARD R. BERCHICK, HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE
UNITED STATES: 2016 3 (U.S. Census Bureau 2017), https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Censu
s/library/publications/2017/demo/p60-260.pdf (reporting that “[i]n 2016, 8.8 percent of people . . .
were uninsured for the entire calendar year,” while “[t]he uninsured rates for Blacks” was 10.5
percent).
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FIGURE 2: TRANSGENDER WOMEN INSURANCE COVERAGE68

67. Grant, supra note 28, at 8.
68. Id.
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FIGURE 3: TRANSGENDER AFRICAN-AMERICAN INSURANCE COVERAGE69

High unemployment and poverty rates among the transgender
population, as well as lesser likelihoods of obtaining health insurance
through their employer, all contribute to this disparity.70 Among
uninsured transgender people, reported rates of “delaying care due to
inability to afford it” are especially high: eighty-six percent for overall
health care, and eighty-eight percent for preventative health care.71 As
discussed in more detail below, even among those who are insured,
the availability of coverage for medical care associated with gender
conformity surgery, hormone therapy, and other care recommended
by the WPATH Standards of Care varies depending both on the type
of health insurance a person has—Medicare, Medicaid, private
insurance, or otherwise—as well as on the varying laws governing
insurance in the person’s state or geographical region.
A. Uncertainty of Federal Protections under
Section 1557 of the Affordable Care Act
Medicare is a federal health insurance program that provides
health insurance for older Americans and people with disabilities.72
Medicare is administered by the federal government and coverage
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id.
Barnett, supra note 66, at 3.
Grant, supra note 28, at 7.
What is the difference between Medicare and Medicaid?, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVS., https://www.hhs.gov/answers/medicare-and-medicaid/what -is-the-differencebetween-medicare-medicaid/index.html (last visited April 4, 2018).
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does not change from state to state. Meanwhile, each of the fifty states
administer their own system for Medicaid, which provides health
insurance to low-income Americans and can vary greatly between
states.73 Private health insurance coverage can also differ depending
on the requirements of a combination of broad federal guidelines and
specific state laws. This section addresses the role of federal
legislation in protecting transgender health care insurance coverage
under these three types of insurance plans.
Medicare, a purely federal program, is administered by the federal
Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”).74 From 1989 to
May 2014, HHS prohibited Medicare from covering gender
conformity surgery,75 and many states did (and still do) prohibit such
coverage under their Medicaid programs.76 In 2014, however, the
federal policy changed; an HHS Departmental Appeals Board
eliminated this categorical exclusion for coverage of transgender
surgery under Medicare, explaining that the classification of—and
resulting prohibition of coverage for—all transition-related treatment
as “cosmetic” or “experimental” is “outdated and not based on current
standards of care.”77 However, because Medicaid is administered by
the states, the HHS Appeals Board Decision directly controlled only
Medicare coverage and did not effect a universal policy change to
protect transgender people under state Medicaid systems.
Then, in May 2016, pursuant to its authority under the Affordable
Care Act (“ACA”), HHS promulgated a final rule that clarified that
the ACA’s prohibition on sex discrimination extends to prohibit
discrimination on the basis of transgender status (among other
prohibited grounds) by all “health insurers receiving Federal financial
assistance [including state Medicaid programs], hospitals, clinics and
73. Id.
74. How is Medicare funded? MEDICARE.GOV, https://www.medicare.gov/about-us/howmedicare-is-funded/medicare-funding.html (last visited April 4, 2018).
75. Medicare Program: National Coverage Decisions, 54 Fed. Reg. 34,555, 34,572 (Aug. 21,
1989) (deeming “transsexual surgery for sex reassignment” to be “controversial,” unsupported by
“well controlled, long-term studies of the safety and effectiveness,” “experimental,” and plagued
by “a high rate of serious complications,” and deciding therefore that “transsexual surgery is not
covered” by Medicare); Know Your Rights | Medicare, NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUALITY
(2018), http://www.transequality.org/know-your-rights/medicare.
76. See infra, text accompanying note 111.
77. NCD 140.3 Transsexual Surgery, DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., DEPARTMENTAL
APPEALS BD., APP. DIV. 1, 12, 21-24 (May 30, 2014), https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static
/dab/decisions/board-decisions/2014/dab2576.pdf (last visited Feb. 18, 2018); see Know Your
Rights | Medicare, supra note 75.
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other health facilities, HHS health programs [such as Medicare] and
activities . . . .”78 The final rule is codified in the Code of Federal
Regulations at 42 C.F.R. part 92 and is entitled, “Nondiscrimination
on the Basis of Race, Color, National Origin, Sex, Age, or Disability
in Health Programs or Activities Receiving Federal Financial
Assistance and Health Programs or Activities Administered by the
Department of Health and Human Services or Entities Established
under Title I of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.”79 The
regulation is based on HHS’s interpretation of section 1557 of the
ACA, which states that “an individual shall not . . . be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under, any health program or activity, any part of which
is receiving Federal financial assistance, including . . . contracts of
insurance . . .” on numerous grounds, including any “ground
prohibited under . . . title IX of the Education Amendments of
1972 . . . ,”80 which in turn prohibits discrimination on the basis of
“sex.”81 Subject to certain exceptions, the rule became effective July
18, 2016.82
With the May 2016 rule, HHS clarified that Section 1557’s
prohibition of sex discrimination in health insurance by any insurer
that receives funding from HHS or that is otherwise subject to Section
1557 of the ACA includes discrimination on the basis of gender
identity and transgender status. The rule amended the definition of
discrimination “on the basis of sex” to include “discrimination on the
basis of . . . gender identity,” which it in turn defined to include
78. Nondiscrimination in Health Programs and Activities, 81 Fed. Reg. 31375,31376,
31375,31454-55 (May 18, 2016) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 92). The rule specifically excludes
Medicare Part B but includes “[s]tate Medicaid agencies receiving Federal financial assistance.”
Nondiscrimination in Health Programs and Activities, 81 Fed. Reg. at 31,445.
79. 45 C.F.R. § 92.207(b) (2016).
80. 42 U.S.C. § 18116(a) (2012). Section 1557’s prohibition on “discrimination on the basis
of race, color, national origin, sex, age, or disability” applies to “[a]ny health program or activity,”
including state Medicaid programs and private health insurers, “any part of which received funding
from HHS” or “that HHS itself administers,” as well as “Health Insurance Marketplaces and all
plans offered by issuers that participate in those Marketplaces.” Office for Civil Rights, Section
1557 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.
(July 30, 2017), https://www.hhs.gov/civil-rights/for-individuals/section 1557/index.html.
81. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a).
82. See Nondiscrimination in Health Programs and Activities, 81 Fed. Reg. 31375,31376,
31375,31473 (May 18, 2016) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 92.4) (“to the extent that provisions of
this rule require[d] changes to health insurance or group health plan benefit design,” the rule
became effective for plan years “beginning on or after January 1, 2017.”); see also 42 U.S.C. §
18116(a) (2012).
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“transgender individual[s].”83 In short, HHS clarified that state
Medicaid programs and private insurers may not discriminate against
transgender individuals. In support of its rulemaking, HHS referenced
the Supreme Court’s opinion in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,84 in
which the Court held that discrimination on the basis of “stereotypical
notions of appropriate behavior, appearance or mannerisms for each
gender constitutes sex discrimination.”85 As HHS pointed out, “in
prohibiting sex discrimination, Congress intended to strike at the
entire spectrum of discrimination against men and women resulting
from sex stereotypes.”86 Numerous lower federal courts have applied
the same reasoning to hold that discrimination against a person based
on his or her transgender status amounts to unlawful sex
discrimination. For instance, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit in Glenn v. Brumby87 considered the claim of a
transgender individual who was diagnosed with GID and who was
terminated from his employment shortly after beginning the process
of gender transition.88 The court unequivocally held that
“discrimination against a transgender individual because of her
gender-nonconformity is sex discrimination, whether it’s described as
being on the basis of sex or gender.”89 While the Price Waterhouse
Court, the Glenn court, and many other federal courts were
interpreting the sex discrimination prohibition under Title VII, as HHS
pointed out, “courts frequently look to case law interpreting other civil
rights provisions, including Title VII, for guidance in interpreting Title
IX,”90 and, accordingly, those cases all support HHS’s decision to
extend Title IX’s—and the ACA’s—prohibition on sex discrimination

83. See 45 C.F.R. § 92.4 (2017); see also Office for Civil Rights, Nondiscrimination in Health
Programs and Activities Proposed Rule: Section 1557 of the Affordable Care Act, U.S. DEP’T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., https://www.hhs.gov/civil-rights/for-individuals/section-1557/nondis
crimination-health-programs-and-activities-proposed-rule/index.html (last updated Sept. 3, 2015).
84. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
85. Nondiscrimination in Health Programs and Activities, 81 Fed. Reg. 31375,31376,
31375,31387-88 (citing Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 250–51).
86. Nondiscrimination in Health Programs and Activities, 81 Fed. Reg. at 31375,31389.
87. 663 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2011).
88. Id. at 1314.
89. Id. at 1317 (citing Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1198–1203 (9th Cir. 2000); Rosa
v. Park W. Bank & Trust Co., 214 F.3d 213, 215–16 (1st Cir. 2000); Smith v. City of Salem, 378
F.3d 566, 569 (6th Cir. 2004); Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 729, 732 (6th Cir. 2005);
Kastl v. Maricopa Cty. Cmty. Coll. Dist., 325 F.App’x. 492, 493 (9th Cir. 2009)).
90. Nondiscrimination in Health Programs and Activities, 81 Fed. Reg. at 31375,31376,
31375,31389.
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to encompass and prohibit discrimination against transgender
individuals as well.
Despite ample statutory and case law support for the HHS
regulation, in August 2016, a group of states and religiously-affiliated
health care organizations filed a lawsuit in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Texas against HHS and the Secretary
of HHS, challenging the HHS regulation’s prohibition on
discrimination by health care providers and insurers on the basis of
transgender status, as well as another amendment prohibiting
discrimination on the basis of termination of pregnancy.91 The
plaintiffs in Franciscan Alliance, Inc. argued that the amended
regulation “pressures doctors to deliver healthcare in a manner that
violates their religious freedom and thwarts their independent medical
judgment.”92 HHS defended its interpretation of section 1557 by
explaining that the regulatory amendment “does not mandate any
particular procedure” but rather “requires only that covered entities
provide nondiscriminatory health services and health insurance in a
nondiscriminatory manner.”93 Specifically, the “discriminatory
actions” that HHS intended to prevent included “[h]av[ing] or
implement[ing] a categorical coverage exclusion or limitation for all
health services related to gender transition.”94 In other words, covered
entities would be prohibited from denying coverage for transitionrelated treatment solely on the basis that such treatment is transitionrelated.
On December 31, 2016, the District Court issued its opinion in
Franciscan Alliance, Inc. v. Burwell and held that HHS’s
interpretation of “sex discrimination” was arbitrary and capricious
insofar as it failed to include an exemption for religious organizations
that are opposed to abortion and gender transition.95 The court
91. Franciscan Alliance, Inc. v. Burwell (Burwell I), 227 F. Supp. 3d 660 (N.D. Tex. 2016).
The lawsuit also challenged a related amendment to the same regulation that clarified that the
prohibition on discrimination on the basis of sex includes discrimination on the basis of termination
of a pregnancy. See id. The original plaintiffs included Nebraska, Kentucky, Kansas, Texas, and
Wisconsin. See Complaint at 1, Franciscan Alliance, Inc. v. Burwell, 227 F. Supp. 3d 660 (N.D.
Tex. 2016) (ECF No. 1). In October 2016, Louisiana, Arizona, and Mississippi joined as plaintiffs.
See First Amended Complaint at 1, Franciscan Alliance, Inc. v. Burwell, 227 F. Supp. 3d 660 (N.D.
Tex. 2016) (ECF No. 21).
92. Franciscan Alliance, Inc., 227 F. Supp. 3d at 671–72.
93. Id. at 672.
94. Id. (quoting 45 C.F.R. § 92.207(b) (2016)).
95. Id. at 692.
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imposed a nationwide injunction barring the enforcement of HHS’s
regulation prohibiting discrimination on the basis of gender identity
and termination of pregnancy.96 Seeking to support the
implementation of HHS’s regulation, the American Civil Liberties
Union and the River City Gender Alliance (collectively, the “ACLU”)
filed a motion to intervene in the case on HHS’s behalf on September
16, 2016, and another motion to stay the injunction on January 9,
2017.97 While not allowing the ACLU to formally intervene, the court
allowed the ACLU to participate as amici curiae.98 The court denied
the ACLU’s motion to stay the injunction on January 24, 2017, leaving
the injunction in place.99 Next, on May 2, 2017, HHS moved the court
to stay the litigation and remand the matter to HHS to give it the
opportunity to reassess its regulation and potentially conduct a new
rulemaking proceeding.100 In its motion, made under the new
presidential administration, HHS represented a willingness to
reconsider the regulation, stating that:
[n]ew leadership at HHS has now had time to scrutinize the
two aspects of the Rule at issue in this case and has concerns
as to the need for, reasonableness, and burden imposed by
those parts of the Rule. HHS takes the concerns of the Court
seriously and should be given the opportunity to initiate
rulemaking proceedings to reconsider the Rule.101

96. Id. at 695.
97. Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Intervene of River City Gender Alliance
and ACLU of Texas, Franciscan Alliance, Inc. v. Burwell, No. 7:16-CV-00108-O (N.D. Tex. Sep.
16, 2016), ECF No. 8; Proposed Intervenors’ Motion for Ruling on Intervention and Stay of
Preliminary Injunction Pending Appeal, Franciscan Alliance, Inc. v. Price, No. 7:16-CV-00108-O
(N.D. Tex. Jan 9, 2017), ECF No. 63; see Matthew Loughran, ACLU to Appeal Court’s Block of
Transgender
Nondiscrimination
Rule,
BLOOMBERG
NEWS
(Jan.
12,
2017),
https://www.bna.com/aclu-appeal-courts-n73014449745.
98. The motion to intervene has had a somewhat convoluted history. Technically, the ACLU
moved both for intervention as of right and for permissive intervention. The court denied the
ACLU’s motion to intervention as of right, and delayed ruling on permissive intervention pending
briefing by the other parties. In the meantime, the ACLU appealed the former ruling to the Fifth
Circuit, and the district court determined that it should not consider the latter in light of the appeal.
See Franciscan Alliance, Inc. v. Price, No. 7:16-cv-00108-O, 2017 WL 3616652, at *1–3, *nn. 4–
7 (N.D. Tex. July 10, 2017).
99. Franciscan Alliance, Inc. v. Burwell (Burwell II), No. 7:16-CV-00108-O, 2017 WL
2964088, at *7 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 24, 2017).
100. Defendant’s Motion for Voluntary Remand and Stay at 1, Franciscan Alliance, Inc. v.
Price, No. 7:16-CV-00108-O (N.D. Tex. May 2, 2017), ECF No. 92.
101. Id. at 3
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The court granted HHS’s motion on July 10, 2017, and entered an
order staying the case indefinitely while leaving the injunction in
effect and the court has been requiring HHS to file periodic status
reports on the progress of HHS’s rulemaking in the meantime.102 For
nine months, HHS reported the same news in multiple status reports,
namely that, under the new presidential administration, “[a] draft of a
proposed rule is going through the clearance process within the
Executive Branch,” and that the proposed rule will then go through
“an inter-agency clearance process managed by the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB”)” and the usual “rulemaking
proceedings” with public “notice and comment” opportunities,103 all
of which could take several years and may well ultimately result in an
agency repeal of the explicit prohibition on transgender
discrimination. Finally, in its April 2018 status report to the court,
HHS revealed that it had submitted its proposed revised rule to OMB
for “inter-agency clearance as required by Executive Order 12,866,”
and that the proposed rule “will not be publicly available until after
the E.O. 12,866 process is complete,” but it did not reveal any of the
content of the proposed revision or hint about the nature of the
revisions.104
The district court’s refusal to date to enforce the prohibition on
discrimination on the basis of transgender status (and HHS’s
willingness to reconsider that prohibition) contradicts the line of
federal court cases arising from Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins
discussed above, as well as an administrative decision, Macy v.
Holder,105 in which the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission concluded that, in the employment context,
“discrimination against a transgender individual because that person
is transgender is, by definition, discrimination ‘based on . . . sex,’”

102. Franciscan Alliance, Inc. v. Price, No. 7:16-cv-00108-O, 2017 WL 3616652, at *5 (N.D.
Tex. July 10, 2017).
103. Defendant’s Status Report at 1–2, Franciscan Alliance, Inc. v. Price, No. 7:16-CV-00108O (N.D. Tex. Aug. 4, 2017), ECF No. 106; Defendant’s Status Report at 1–2, Franciscan Alliance,
Inc. v. Price, No. 7:16-CV-00108-O (N.D. Tex. Oct. 16, 2017), ECF No. 109; Defendant’s Status
Report at 1–2, Franciscan Alliance, Inc. v. Price, No. 7:16-CV-00108-O (N.D. Tex. Dec. 15, 2017),
ECF No. 110; Defendant’s Status Report at 1–2, Franciscan Alliance, Inc. v. Azar, No. 7:16-CV00108-O (N.D. Tex. Feb. 13, 2018), ECF No. 111.
104. See Defendant’s Status Report at 1, Franciscan Alliance, Inc. v. Azar, No. 7:16-CV-00108O (N.D. Tex. Apr. 16, 2018), ECF No. 113.
105. No. 0120120821, 2012 WL 1435995 (EEOC Apr. 20, 2012).
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and hence prohibited under Title VII.106 Yet the Franciscan Alliance,
Inc. decision will stand unless and until an appellate court reverses or
stays the injunction, or until HHS promulgates a revised regulation
and thereby inspires the district court to lift its injunction. For now,
the injunction prevents the enforcement against state Medicaid
programs and private insurers of HHS regulations that prohibit
discrimination in the context of health insurance against transgender
and gender nonconforming people.107 Although the injunction may
limit HHS’s ability to investigate and respond to discrimination
against transgender patients the injunction does not affect HHS’s
decision to cover gender conformity surgery and hormone therapy
under Medicare for elderly Americans and Americans with
disabilities. Nor does it affect coverage in the numerous states where
state law explicitly requires that Medicaid and/or private insurers must
cover these procedures, as discussed in more detail in the next
section.108 However, the injunction might affect the rate at which
remaining states adopt explicit coverage protections.109
B. State Law Protections Governing
Private Insurance and Medicaid
State insurance law governs what health insurance providers must
cover under state Medicaid programs and private health insurance
plans.110 A growing number of state legislatures have adopted some
form of insurance safeguards for transgender people. As of January
22, 2018, the insurance laws of nineteen states and the District of
Columbia prohibit private insurers from excluding transgender health
care coverage; those states are: California, Colorado, Connecticut,
Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan,
106. Id. at *11.
107. See Burwell I, 227 F. Supp. 3d at 695; see also George B. Breen & Jonathan K. Hoerner,
Court Issues Nationwide Injunction Prohibiting Enforcement of Section 1557 Provisions Relating
to Gender Identity and Termination of Pregnancy—But Other Provisions Still Can Be Enforced,
HEALTH L. ADVISOR (Jan. 9, 2017), https://www.healthlawadvisor.com/2017/01/09/court-issuesnationwide-injunction-prohibiting-enforcement-of-section-1557-provisions-relating-to-genderidentity-and-termination-of-pregnancy-but-other-provisions-still-can-be-enforced/.
108. Georgia Burke, Injunction Puts Focus on Need to Keep 1557 Protections, JUST. IN AGING
(Jan. 9, 2017), http://www.justiceinaging.org/injunction-limits-health-care-protections-transgende
r-individuals.
109. Id.
110. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 303 (1985) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(19)). State
insurance law also governs requirements for state employee health care insurance coverage.
However, this paper focuses on insurance coverage requirements for non-state employees.
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Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington.111 Twelve of
those nineteen states and the District of Columbia also more generally
prohibit private health insurance discrimination based on sexual
orientation and gender identity; New Jersey prohibits health insurance
discrimination based only on sexual orientation, not gender identity.112
Figure 4 illustrates the distribution of these legal protections among
the various states.
FIGURE 4: HEALTHCARE LAWS AND POLICIES: PRIVATE INSURANCE113

Notably, some of the nineteen states that require private insurers
to cover transgender health care do not explicitly provide this same
coverage under their Medicaid programs.114 Yet Medicaid patients in
the District of Columbia and the following eighteen states are
explicitly protected under state policy to receive coverage for
transgender health care: California, Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii,
Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington.115 The list of states that have
111. Healthcare Laws and Policies: Table Format, MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT,
http://www.lgbtmap.org/equality-maps/healthcare_laws_and_policies (last updated Apr. 13,
2018).
112. Id.
113. Healthcare Laws and Policies: Private Insurance, MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT,
http://www.lgbtmap.org/equality-maps/healthcare_laws_and_policies
(last updated Apr. 13, 2018).
114. Id. Specifically, Delaware and Michigan have explicit transgender non-discrimination
protections under private insurance plans, but both states are silent on whether transgender nondiscrimination rules apply under Medicaid.
115. Id.
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adopted laws to protect transgender access to healthcare has continued
to change and grow; please visit the Movement Advancement Project
website for the most recent updated list.116 Figure 5 illustrates these
differences in Medicaid coverage in the various states.
FIGURE 5: HEALTHCARE LAWS AND POLICIES: MEDICAID117

The state laws providing explicit protections for transgender
patients under private insurance and/or Medicaid have a common
theme: the threshold that the covered treatments are “medically
necessary.” For instance, California’s insurance statutes and
regulations generally require health insurance providers to cover
medically necessary basic health care services and pharmaceuticals118
and permit them to deny coverage on the basis that a procedure is not
“medically necessary.”119 Section 2561.2 of Title 10 of the California
Code of Regulations prohibits transgender discrimination by insurers
as follows:
An admitted insurer shall not, in connection with health
insurance as defined in subdivision (b) of Insurance Code
section 106, discriminate on the basis of an insured’s or
prospective insured’s actual or perceived gender identity, or
116. Id.
117. Healthcare Laws and Policies: Medicaid, MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT
http://www.lgbtmap.org/equality-maps/healthcare_laws_and_policies (last updated Apr. 13,
2018).
118. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1367.005 (West 2017); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 28, §§
1300.67.24, 1300.71.4 (2018); CAL. INS. CODE § 10123.193(c) (West 2018).
119. See, e.g., CAL. INS. CODE §§ 10112.27, 10123.7, 10123.135, 10123.201 (West 2018);
CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 511 (West 1997); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 10, §§ 2562.2, 2699.300,
2699.301, 2699.6203 (West 2017).
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on the basis that the insured or prospective insured is a
transgender person.120
The statute goes on to list a number of prohibited forms of
discrimination, including “[d]enying, cancelling, [or] limiting” health
insurance coverage “on the basis of an insured’s or prospective
insured’s actual or perceived gender identity or” their status as a
“transgender person” and “[d]enying or limiting coverage” for
transition-related and non-transition-related health care services on the
basis of gender identity.121 Section 2561.2 concludes by stating: “This
Section . . . shall have no bearing on the question of whether or not a
particular health care service is medically necessary in any individual
case.”122 Accordingly, although insurers may not discriminate on the
basis of transgender status in providing health insurance coverage,
they may attempt to deny coverage for gender conformity surgery and
other transition-related care on the basis of medical necessity and
follow the procedures set up by California law for challenging medical
necessity.123 In addition, the guidance for Medi-Cal benefits
(California’s version of Medicaid) specifically states that “[t]reatment
for Gender Identity Disorder (GID) is a covered Medi-Cal benefit
when medical necessity has been demonstrated.”124
Likewise, Oregon’s regulations—which are modeled after
California Code of Regulations Title 10 § 2561—include similar
language creating the same ban on transgender discrimination bundled
with the same “medically necessary” caveat when describing the
requirements for private insurers to cover treatments for gender
dysphoria.125 The relevant Oregon statute states:
An individual may not, on the basis of actual or perceived . . .
gender identity . . . be excluded from participation in, be
denied the benefits of or otherwise be subjected to
discrimination by any health benefit plan issued or delivered
in this state, in the receipt of medical assistance . . . or in the

120. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 10, § 2561.2 (2017).
121. Id. §§ 2561.2(a)(1), 2561.2(a)(4).
122. Id. (emphasis added).
123. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 28, § 1300.68 (West 2018).
124. Medi-Cal Update, MEDI-CAL (Mar. 2013), http://files.medi-cal.ca.gov/pubsdoco/bulletin
s/artfull/gm201303.asp#a21 (last visited Feb. 18, 2018) (emphasis added).
125. KATE BROWN, OREGON DIVISION OF FINANCIAL REGULATION BULLETIN DFR 2016-1
1(2012), https://dfr.oregon.gov/laws-rules/Documents/Bulletins/bulletin2016-01.pdf.

[CORRECTED](6)51.1_YOUNGMAN (DO NOT DELETE)

2018]

3/27/2019 5:17 PM

PROTECTING TRANSGENDER HEALTH CARE

29

coverage of or payment for the services, drugs, devices,
products and procedures . . . .126
Elsewhere in the Oregon statutes however, as in California, insurers
are given the authority to deny coverage on the basis of “medical
necessity;” presumably, then transgender services may be denied on
the basis of lack of medical necessity.127 Finally, as in California,
Oregon’s version of Medicaid, the Oregon Health Plan, covers
treatment for gender dysphoria, including hormone therapy and sex
reassignment surgery.128
Consequently, in California, Oregon, and other states that have
adopted prohibitions on discrimination on the basis of transgender
status in the context of insurance, the meaning and interpretation of
the term “medical necessity” are crucial to whether insured patients
actually receive coverage for their treatment. Yet there is no federal
statutory language—and, often, no state statutory language—to define
“medical necessity.”129 Medical necessity, as defined by
Medicare.gov, describes “Health care services or supplies needed to
diagnose or treat an illness, injury, condition, disease, or its symptoms
and that meet accepted standards of medicine.”130 Explicit definitions
(where they exist) typically incorporate, at minimum, the two-pronged
requirement that “medically necessary” health care must involve
services or supplies that (1) evaluate or treat an illness or other
condition, as well as (2) align with applicable medical standards.131
However, the determination whether specific treatments are
126. OR. REV. STAT. § 659.875 (2017).
127. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. §§ 743B.001, 743B.225, 743B.252, 743B.256, 743B.281,
743B.282, 743B.420, 743B.422, 743B.423 (2017).
128. Prioritized List: Guideline for Gender Dysphoria: Frequently Asked Questions, OR.
HEALTH AUTHORITY (Oct. 2015), http://www.oregon.gov/OHA/HPA/CSI-HERC/FactSheets/Gen
der-dysphoria.pdf.
129. See, eg., Thie v. Davis, 688 N.E.2d 182, 188 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (noting “the absence of
a definition of medical necessity”).
130. Glossary–M, U.S. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., https://www.medicare.gov
/glossary/m.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2018) (emphasis added).
131. See Policy 8: Definition and Application of Medical Necessity, AM. COLL. OF MED.
QUALITY, http://www.acmq.org/policies/policy8.pdf (last visited Feb. 18, 2018) (“Medical
necessity is defined as accepted health care services and supplies provided by health care entities,
appropriate to the evaluation and treatment of a disease, condition, illness or injury and consistent
with the applicable standard of care.”) (emphasis added); see also, Medical Necessity Definitions,
CIGNA, https://www.cigna.com/healthcare-professionals/resources-for-health-care-professionals/
clinical-payment-and-reimbursement-policies/medical-necessity-definitions (last visited Feb. 18,
2018) (“‘Medically Necessary’ . . . shall mean health care services . . . for the purpose of
evaluating, diagnosing or treating an illness, injury, disease or its symptoms, and that are . . . in
accordance with the generally accepted standards of medical practice . . . .”) (emphasis added).
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“medically necessary,” if not explicitly addressed via state statute, can
remain unclear.132
Some argue that gender conformity surgery and other transitionrelated procedures are “medically necessary” and must therefore be
covered under all state Medicaid plans, in accordance with guidelines
for “general medical necessity” (which is determined by state
legislature and relies on the consensus of the medical community) and
“specific medical necessity” (which relies on the judgment of the
specific patient’s physician).133 Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court, in its
opinion in Beal v. Doe,134 wrote that “serious statutory questions might
be presented if a state Medicaid plan excluded necessary medical
treatment from its coverage.”135 However, the “Federal Medicaid Act
does not explicitly require states to cover all medically necessary
treatment.”136 Therefore, the argument that transition-related
procedures are “medically necessary” merely opens state Medicaid
statutes up for debate.
In addition to disparities in coverage under Medicaid, coverage,
even for “medically necessary” treatments, can vary greatly depending
on the patient’s specific health insurance plan.137 Although the widelyaccepted WPATH Standards of Care recognize gender conformity
surgery, hormone therapy, and other transition-related treatments as
medically necessary,138 this language leaves room for ambiguity that
may cause additional obstacles to coverage and therefore treatment,
which this paper addresses in Section IV.
Because federal regulations that prohibit discrimination by health
insurers against transgender people are currently unenforceable due to
132. See, e.g., Choose the Right Plan, CAL. DEP’T OF MANAGED HEALTH CARE,
https://www.dmhc.ca.gov/HealthCareinCalifornia/ChoosetheRightPlan.aspx#.Wg4ti7Q-et8 (last
visited Feb. 18, 2018) (“A definition of what is medically necessary can be found in your health
plan contract . . . .”).
133. Nicole M. True, Removing the Constraints to Coverage of Gender-Conforming Healthcare
by State Medicaid Programs, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1329, 1343–44 (2012) (explaining general and
specific necessities).
134. 432 U.S. 438 (1977).
135. Id. at 444.
136. True, supra note 133, at 1342.
137. See, e.g., Definition and Application of Medical Necessity, supra note 131 (“Preventive
care may be Medically Necessary but coverage for Medically Necessary preventive care is
governed by terms of the applicable Plan Documents.”) (emphasis added).
138. WORLD PROF’L ASS’N FOR TRANSGENDER HEALTH, supra note 36, at 5 (“Medical
treatment options include, for example, feminization or masculinization of the body through
hormone therapy and/or surgery, which are effective in alleviating gender dysphoria and are
medically necessary for many people.”) (emphasis added).
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the Franciscan Alliance, Inc. Court’s nationwide injunction, statelevel legislation has become ever more important.139 As illustrated in
Figure 4, thirty-seven states lack laws providing transgender-inclusive
private insurance protections, and thirty-two states either have no
explicit Medicaid policy (twenty-two) or explicitly exclude
transgender health coverage (ten) under Medicaid.140 As indicated
above, in those states without protective laws, transgender people who
have insurance can find themselves denied coverage for transitionrelated procedures and even basic health care; often, this is due to the
use of binary gender categories (male or female) as a proxy for
determining which gender-specific services are covered,141 or due to a
health care provider’s failure to sufficiently show that a given
treatment is “necessary” for a given patient.142
Due to these inequalities in access to transgender-inclusive
medical care, many transgender people incur vast out-of-pocket
expenses for both transgender health-related health care services
including gender conformity surgery and hormone therapy, as well as
potentially even basic medical procedures.143 They may also be forced
to travel long distances to find appropriate care providers, which can
mean that even a patient who is insured might be denied coverage if
the insurer considers a provider “out-of-network.”144 For all of these
patients—those living in states that prohibit insurers from
discriminating against transgender people but whose care is deemed
“not medically necessary” and those in states without such
prohibitions—the possibility of deducting medical expenses from
taxable income (known as the “medical deduction”) is the only
remaining federal protection providing any hope for financial relief
for transition-related health care costs. The following section
139. Burwell I, 227 F. Supp. 3d 660 (N.D. Tex. 2016).
140. Healthcare Laws and Policies, MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT (July 20, 2015),
http://www.lgbtmap.org/equality-maps/healthcare_laws_and_policies.
141. Lisa Gillespie, Transgender People Still Denied Health Services Despite Affordable Care
Act, PBS (July 23, 2015, 2:52 PM), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/transgender-peoplestill-denied-health-services-despite-affordable-care-act.
142. Transgender Health Benefits in California, TRANSGENDER L. CTR. 3 (Dec. 2, 2015),
http://transgenderlawcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/2015-12-02-TLC-Health-AppealsGuide.pdf).
143. Liz Kowalczyk, In Mass., Transgender Patients Decry Hostility Over Medical Care,
BOSTON GLOBE (Feb. 1, 2017), https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2017/02/01/transgenderpeople-say-hostility-ignorance-common-doctors-offices-emergencyrooms/HYfNoCi2HAHw1QANBJnMJP/story.html.
144. Id.
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describes the medical deduction and its applications within the realm
of transgender health care.
III. OVERVIEW OF THE MEDICAL DEDUCTION AS IT PERTAINS TO
TRANSGENDER HEALTH CARE
A. Introduction to the Medical Deduction
Since the passage of the United States Revenue Act of 1942,
Americans have been entitled to deduct medical expenses from their
taxable income, so long as they met the applicable threshold.145 That
threshold was moved to 7.5% for tax year 1987, and then to 10% as of
tax year 2013.146 After passage of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act on
December 22, 2017, the federal medical deduction threshold will be
reduced back to 7.5% of the taxpayer’s Adjusted Gross Income
(“AGI”) for tax years 2017 and 2018; after tax year 2018, the threshold
for medical deductions will increase back to 10% of AGI.147
Currently, about 30% of U.S. taxpayers file itemized federal tax
returns.148 This number is expected to decrease starting in 2018, as the
Tax Cuts and Jobs Act nearly doubles the standard deduction from
$6,350 to $12,000 for single individuals and from $12,700 to $24,000
for married couples filing jointly.149 Among these itemized returns, the
medical and dental deduction accounted for $82,811,803 of the
$1,206,705,085 (about 6.86%) estimated total itemized deductions
claimed in 2014.150 Only a small percentage of U.S. taxpayers claim
this tax benefit; in 2015, only about 8.8 million Americans claimed the
medical deduction on their tax returns.151 In general, taxpayers who
itemize their tax deductions “tend to be middle to upper income

145. Revenue Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-753, 56 Stat. 798.
146. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085; Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 868 (2010).
147. See Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 11027, 131 Stat. 2044; see also
Michelle Andrews, Bonus Tucked into GOP Tax Bill for Those Aiming to Deduct Medical
Expenses, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Dec. 22, 2017), https://khn.org/news/bonus-tucked-into-goptax-bill-for-those-aiming-to-deduct-medical-expenses.
148. SOI Tax Stats – Tax Stats at a Glance, IRS (2017), https://www.irs.gov/uac/soi-tax-statstax-stats-at-a-glance.
149. Sarah O’Brien, GOP Tax Bill Expands Medical Expense Deduction for Two Years, CNBC
(Dec. 16, 2017, 10:24 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/12/16/gop-tax-bill-expands-medicalexpense-deduction-for-two-years.html.
150. John A. Koskinen et al., Individual Tax Returns Line Item Estimates, 2014, IRS,
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/14inlinecount.pdf (last updated Aug. 30, 2018).
151. Andrews, supra note 147.

[CORRECTED](6)51.1_YOUNGMAN (DO NOT DELETE)

2018]

3/27/2019 5:17 PM

PROTECTING TRANSGENDER HEALTH CARE

33

taxpayers” in light of the level of expenditures necessary to exceed the
standard deduction, and fewer of those taxpayers may incur
unreimbursed medical expenses that exceed the threshold percentage,
as compared to other deductions with no threshold such as taxes paid,
mortgage interest, and charitable deductions.152
Yet for those taxpayers who incur large out-of-pocket medical
expenses that are not covered by health insurance, the medical
deduction provides relief that is unavailable elsewhere. As described
above, the transgender community continues to face immense out-ofpocket expenses for both transition-related and routine medical care,
due to a combination of discrimination, lack of insurance protections,
and lack of knowledge of transgender health needs within the medical
industry, and the question whether those expenses qualify for the
medical deduction is therefore an important one for the community.
Deductible costs can include many expenses associated with
health care, including travel to and from medical appointments,
prescription medications, and other out-of-pocket costs not covered by
insurance or tax-preferred health savings accounts.153 Yet the
determination whether a particular expense is a deductible medical
expense is not always clear: issues arise regarding whether a particular
expense is truly medically necessary, and not, for instance, associated
with cosmetic surgery.154
B. Definition of “Medical Care” Under
Internal Revenue Code § 213
Under section 213 of the Internal Revenue Code, the term
“medical care” means amounts paid “for the diagnosis, cure,
mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease, or for the purpose of
affecting any structure or function of the body.”155 Accordingly, the
Code recognizes two categories of medical care expenses that can
qualify as deductible: first, medical expenditures for the “diagnosis,
cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease” and, second,

152. Kelly Phillips Erb, Deduct This: The History of the Medical Expenses Deduction, FORBES
(June 11, 2011, 8:25 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kellyphillipserb/2011/06/20/deduct-thisthe-history-of-the-medical-expenses-deduction/#64be8311478c.
153. I.R.C. § 213(d) (2017).
154. See infra Section II.B.
155. I.R.C. § 213(d)(1)(A) (2017).
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medical expenditures that “affect[] any structure or function of the
body.”156
The legislative and case history surrounding this statutory
definition has first expanded, then subsequently narrowed, the
definition of what qualifies as “medical care.” In 1981, the U.S. Tax
Court applied the second category and decided that it was “broad
enough to include hair transplant surgery . . . [performed] solely for
cosmetic reasons”157 because such surgery “affected” a “structure” of
the body insofar as it involved changing the structure of the scalp.158
In response, in 1990, Congress amended the statute explicitly to
exclude cosmetic surgery, defined below, in order to curtail the use of
the medical deduction for elective cosmetic surgery. 159 The amended
statute reads:
(213)(d)(9) Cosmetic surgery.
(A) In general. – The term “medical care” does not include
cosmetic surgery or other similar procedures, unless the
surgery or procedure is necessary to ameliorate a deformity
arising from, or directly related to, a congenital abnormality,
a personal injury resulting from an accident or trauma, or
disfiguring disease.
(B) Cosmetic surgery defined. – For purposes of this
paragraph, the term “cosmetic surgery” means any procedure
which is directed at improving the patient’s appearance and
does not meaningfully promote the proper function of the
body or prevent or treat illness or disease.160
Accordingly, in order for cosmetic surgery to qualify as medical care
that qualifies for the medical deduction, it must satisfy one of the
following conditions:
1. Be “necessary to ameliorate a deformity arising from, or
directly related to, a congenital abnormality, a personal

156. Id.
157. Eric Smith & Ryan H. Pace, Deductible Cosmetic Surgery and the Treatment of
Transgenderism: An Analysis of the Medical Expense Deduction Post-O’Donnabhain, AM. TAX’N
ASS’N MIDYEAR MEETING: JLTR CONF. Feb. 2012, at 12, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm
?abstract_id=2003902.
158. Mattes v. Comm’r, 77 T.C. 650, 653 (1981); Smith & Pace, supra note 157, at 12–13.
159. I.R.C. § 213(d)(9) (2017); Smith & Pace, supra note 157, at 14.
160. I.R.C. § 213(d)(9) (2017) (emphasis added).
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injury resulting from an accident or trauma, or disfiguring
disease,”161 or
2. “[M]eaningfully promote the proper function of the
body,”162 or
3. “[P]revent or treat illness or disease.”163
Within the context of transition-related care, as discussed in more
detail below, litigants have focused on the third option (the treatment
of the symptoms of an illness, namely gender dysphoria) to argue that
gender conformity surgery is deductible medical care, rather than nondeductible cosmetic surgery.
The Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) provides guidance on the
interpretation and application of the various requirements of the
Internal Revenue Code through numerous publications. One such
publication, IRS Publication 502, provides guidance to taxpayers on
the inclusion of certain expenses as medical expenses for the purposes
of calculating their medical deduction.164 The Publication begins by
defining “medical expenses” with language mirroring the statute:
“Medical expenses are the costs of diagnosis, cure, mitigation,
treatment, or prevention of disease, and the costs for treatments
affecting any part or function of the body.”165 It goes on to list
examples of deductible expenses: “payments for legal medical
services rendered by physicians, surgeons, dentists, and other medical
practitioners” and “the costs of equipment, supplies, and diagnostic
devices needed for these purposes.”166 The Publication then elaborates
on these categories. Besides the obvious examples of medical care
such as out-of-pocket payments to physicians for office visits and for
surgeries to treat physical illnesses and injuries, the following
categories might also be relevant to deductions for transition-related
care:
1. Deductions for Prescribed Medication: Taxpayers may deduct
amounts paid to obtain prescription medications obtained in the

161. I.R.C. § 213(d)(9)(A) (2017).
162. I.R.C. § 213(d)(9)(B) (2017).
163. Id.
164. Pub. 502 (2017) Medical and Dental Expenses, IRS (2017), https://www.irs.gov/
publications/p502/ar02.html.
165. Id.
166. Id.

[CORRECTED](6)51.1_YOUNGMAN (DO NOT DELETE)

36

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

3/27/2019 5:17 PM

[Vol. 51: 1

U.S.167 A taxpayer generally cannot include amounts paid to obtain
non-prescription medications other than insulin.168
2. Deductions for Mental Health-Related Medical Expenses: The
cost of psychiatric care, psychoanalysis, and therapy for medical
treatment may all be included in deductible medical expenses. 169 A
taxpayer may deduct legal fees paid that are “necessary to authorize
treatment for mental illness.”170 However, a taxpayer cannot deduct as
medical expenses legal fees for “the management of a guardianship
estate, fees for conducting the affairs of the person being treated, or
other fees” that are not directly necessary for medical care.171
3. Deductions for Cosmetic Purposes: Publication 502 repeats and
elaborates on the statutory exception for “unnecessary cosmetic
surgery.”172 Generally, a taxpayer cannot include in medical expenses
the amount one pays for elective cosmetic surgery, such as “facelifts,
hair transplant surgery, hair removal (electrolysis), and
liposuction.”173 The Publication states that a taxpayer, however, can
deduct as medical expenses the amount paid for cosmetic surgery “if
it is necessary to improve a deformity arising from, or directly related
to, a congenital abnormality, a personal injury resulting from an
accident or trauma, or a disfiguring disease.”174 For instance, a
taxpayer may deduct amounts paid for breast reconstruction surgery
following a mastectomy to treat breast cancer.175 Additionally, a
taxpayer may deduct “the cost of a wig purchased upon the advice of
a physician for the mental health of a patient who has lost all his or her
hair from disease.”176 The Publication thereby presents an important
distinction: Although a wig is not deductible if it merely serves to
protect the mental health of a patient suffering from genetic hair loss,
a wig is deductible if it is (a) recommended by a physician and (b)
protects the mental health of a patient who has suffered hair loss from
disease. It follows that cosmetic medical expenses are only deductible
if recommended by a physician as treatment for symptoms related to
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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a specific disease. Significantly, Publication 502 is silent on the issue
whether gender conformity surgery is a deductible medical expense or
a non-deductible cosmetic surgery, and it has not been revised to
explicitly address the issue, even in the wake of the O’Donnabhain
decision discussed below.
4. Other Deductions: According to Publication 502, a taxpayer
can deduct “amounts paid for transportation primarily for, and
essential to, medical care.”177 This includes mileage reimbursement at
a rate of 17 cents per mile and airfare to and from medical
treatments.178 Additionally, subject to certain restrictions outlined in
the Publication, a taxpayer may also deduct out-of-pocket health
insurance premiums and other costs for one’s own or a qualifying
dependent’s health care services.179 Significantly, neither the Internal
Revenue Code, nor the IRS’s implementing regulations, nor
Publication 502 address medical necessity beyond the Publication’s
passing reference to “unnecessary cosmetic surgery,”180 nor does the
Publication identify medical necessity as a threshold requirement for
deductibility.
IV. EFFECT OF O’DONNABHAIN V. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE ON TRANSGENDER HEALTH CARE TREATMENT UNDER TAX
LAW
A. Case Background
As discussed above, being transgender in the United States brings
with it many financial, legal, and other challenges related to access to
care beyond those typically faced by the population at large. In
O’Donnabhain v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,181 the United
States Tax Court addressed the issue whether transition-related
treatment costs qualify for the medical deduction, thereby offering a
potential financial solution to transgender health care challenges.182
Yet by reaching the unnecessary question whether transition-related
treatments were medically necessary, the court created a double-edged
sword: it lent credibility to the idea that transition-related treatments,
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
134 T.C. 34 (2010).
Id. at 35.
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including those described by the WPATH Standards of Care, are
medically necessary, which is surely helpful precedent for individuals
contesting adverse insurance coverage determinations to the contrary.
Yet it also potentially—and erroneously—creates precedent for
imposing a heightened “medically necessary” threshold on medical
tax deductions, making paying for transition-related treatments
potentially harder to afford for an already marginalized population.
The case arose when petitioner Rhiannon G. O’Donnabhain
sought to deduct medical expenses associated with her treatment for
GID (as it was then known) from her federal income taxes.183 In a
controversial court decision, the United States Tax Court held that
GID is a disease within the meaning of the tax code,184 and that the
cost of hormone replacement therapy and sex reassignment surgery to
treat O’Donnabhain’s GID were therefore deductible medical care
(and not cosmetic surgery),185 but that her breast augmentation surgery
was cosmetic in nature and therefore not deductible.186 The
controversial majority opinion, joined by eight of the 16 Tax Court
judges who heard the case, was accompanied by numerous concurring
and dissenting opinions that, as one judge aptly noted, put the court
“squarely . . . in the middle of a serious fight within the relevant
scientific community, and the larger battle among those who are
deeply concerned with the proper response to transsexual persons’
desires for extensive and expensive surgeries.”187
The court described the facts of the case as follows:
O’Donnabhain “was born a genetic male with unambiguous male
genitalia” and assigned that gender at birth but, since childhood, felt
“uncomfortable in the male gender role.”188 She began wearing
“women’s clothing secretly around age ten.”189 Throughout her
adolescence and into her adulthood, “[h]er discomfort . . . intensified,
and she continued to dress in women’s clothing secretly.”190 In August
183. Id. at 42.
184. Id. at 59 (“we conclude that GID is a ‘disease’ within the meaning of section 213.”).
185. Id. at 70 (“We therefore conclude and hold that petitioner’s hormone therapy and sex
reassignment surgery ‘treated . . . disease’ within the meaning of section 213(d)(9)(B) and
accordingly are not ‘cosmetic surgery’ . . .”).
186. Id. at 73 (“[T]he breast augmentation surgery is ‘cosmetic surgery’ that is excluded from
deductible ‘medical care.’”).
187. Id. at 92 (Holmes, J., concurring).
188. Id. at 35.
189. Id.
190. Id.
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1996, O’Donnabhain began seeing Diane Ellaborn, a licensed
psychotherapist.191 “After diagnosing severe GID in petitioner
[O’Donnabhain] in early 1997, Ellaborn administered a course of
treatment” in accordance with WPATH’s Standards of Care.192
Pursuant to her prescribed treatment, O’Donnabhain began hormone
therapy in September 1997, which she continued through the taxable
year 2001.193 O’Donnabhain began presenting herself publicly as
female in March 2000.194
Despite her positive response to hormone therapy and public
transition to the female gender role, O’Donnabhain’s “anxiety as a
result of having male genitalia persisted,” and Ellaborn determined
that, absent surgery, “petitioner’s anxiety . . . would impair her ability
to function normally in society.”195 Ellaborn and a second licensed
psychotherapist, Dr. Alex Coleman, provided the two required
recommendations in favor of gender conformity surgery.196 In 2001,
at their referrals, O’Donnabhain underwent pre-surgery consultation
and gender conformity surgery performed by Dr. Toby Meltzer, a
“board-certified plastic and reconstructive surgeon, with over 10
years’ experience specializing in” gender conformity surgery.197
During 2001, O’Donnabhain incurred and paid the following
expenditures, which she claimed as deductible medical expenses on
her 2001 federal income tax return:198
(1) $19,195 to Dr. Meltzer for surgical procedures, including
$14,495 for vaginoplasty and other procedures, $4,500 for
breast augmentation, and $200 towards a portion of
petitioner’s postsurgical stay at Dr. Meltzer’s facility; (2) $60
for medical equipment; (3) $1,544 in travel and lodging costs
away from home for presurgical consultation and surgery; (4)
$300 to Ms. Ellaborn for therapy; (5) $260 for the
consultation for a second referral letter for surgery; and (6)
$382 for hormone therapy. These payments [which totaled

191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

Id. at 36.
Id. at 39.
Id.
Id. at 39–40.
Id. at 40.
Id. at 41.
Id. at 40–41.
Id. at 42.
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$21,741] were not compensated for by insurance or
otherwise.199
During a subsequent audit, the Office of the Chief Counsel of the IRS
expressed doubt that the expenses were incurred either “to promote
the proper functioning of [O’Donnabhain’s] body” or “for treatment
of a disfiguring condition” and thus concluded that the expenses did
not qualify for the exception to the cosmetic surgery exclusion.200 It
also cited the opinions of a Dr. Paul McHugh concerning the
“controversial” nature of surgery and other treatments for gender
dysphoria.201 Subsequently, the IRS determined that none of those
expenses qualified for the medical deduction, and it denied
O’Donnabhain’s deductions and demanded a return of her tax
refund.202 O’Donnabhain then petitioned the U.S. Tax Court for a
determination whether that denial was in error.
B. Opposition to WPATH’s Standards of Care:
Historical Context of the IRS Response
Ample evidence demonstrates that, at the time of its decision to
deny O’Donnabhain’s deductions, the IRS was under a great deal of
pressure not to allow medical deductions for transgender transitionrelated health care, which may have biased the IRS in favor of denying
O’Donnabhain’s deduction. The IRS Office of Chief Counsel cited
controversial research by Dr. Paul McHugh (then leader of President
George W. Bush’s Council on Bioethics) in its advice to the Boston
IRS Appeals Office, which office thereafter denied O’Donnabhain’s
requested medical deductions.203 Dr. McHugh, who was and remains
an outspoken opponent of WPATH’s Standards of Care, has stated
that those who enable transgender people to undergo the transition

199. Id.
200. Memorandum Number 200603025, OFFICE OF CHIEF COUNS. I.R.S. 1, 5 (Oct. 14, 2005),
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-wd/0603025.pdf.
201. Id. (“In light of the Congressional emphasis on denying a deduction for procedures relating
to appearance in all but a few circumstances and the controversy surrounding whether GRS [gender
reassignment surgery] is a treatment for an illness or disease, the materials submitted do not support
a deduction.”).
202. O’Donnabhain, 134 T.C. at 42 (IRS “disallowed [the foregoing medical expenditures] in
a notice of deficiency.”).
203. Katherine Pratt, The Tax Definition of “Medical Care:” A Critique of the Startling IRS
Arguments in O’Donnabhain v. Commissioner, 23 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 313, 333–34, 344 (2016)
(citing Memorandum Number 200603025, OFFICE OF CHIEF COUNS. I.R.S. 1, 5 (Oct. 14, 2005),
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-wd/0603025.pdf.
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process are “collaborating with madness.”204 In addition, around the
same time, a conservative Christian advocacy group, the Traditional
Values Coalition, sent Mark Everson, IRS Commissioner under
President Bush, a letter “to demand that the IRS not allow a deduction
for O’Donnabhain’s costs of medical transition,” citing views
expressed by Dr. McHugh.205 The pressure was at least partially
successful: the IRS (including its Office of Chief Counsel) frequently
cited Dr. McHugh’s views in IRS advice and arguments throughout
the subsequent tax litigation.206
In a widely read Op-Ed published in the Wall Street Journal, Dr.
McHugh contends that transgender people suffer from the “disordered
assumption” that one’s experienced gender differs from the gender he
describes as “given in nature,” that is, the traditionally perceived
binary gender (male or female), usually assigned based on one’s
genitalia at birth (sometimes referred to as one’s “natal gender” within
the medical community).207 He explains that typical “disordered
assumptions” recognized by the psychiatric community include the
disordered assumptions associated with anorexia and bulimia nervosa,
wherein “the dangerously thin [believe] that they are overweight.”208
Applying this reasoning, Dr. McHugh advocates not for validation of
transgender individuals’ perceived gender with gender conformity
surgery and other gender-conforming procedures, but rather for
treatment of their “disordered assumption” with psychotherapy and
medication designed to realign the patient’s perceived gender with the
patient’s natal sex.209

204. Michael W. Chapman, Johns Hopkins Psychiatrist: Support of Transgenderism and SexChange Surgery is ‘Collaborating with Madness’, CNS NEWS (June 2, 2016), http://www.cnsnews.
com/blog/michael-w-chapman/johns-hopkins-psychiatrist-support-transgenderism-and-sexchange-surgery.
205. Pratt, supra note 203, at 317 (citing Katherine T. Phan, TVC Asks IRS to Reverse Tax
Deduction for Sex-Change Operation, CHRISTIAN POST (Dec. 15, 2004), https://www.christianpost
.com/news/tvc-asks-irs-to-reverse-tax-deduction-for-sex-change-operation-20790).
206. Pratt, supra note 203, at 348–52.
207. Paul McHugh, Transgender Surgery Isn’t the Solution, WALL STREET J. (June 12, 2014,
2:18 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/paul-mchugh-transgender-surgery-isnt-the-solution-1402
615120; AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS 451 (5th ed. 2013).
208. McHugh, Transgender Surgery, supra note 207.
209. Id.; Paul R. McHugh, Surgical Sex: Why We Stopped Doing Sex Change Operations,
FIRST THINGS (Nov. 2004), https://www.firstthings.com/article/2004/11/surgical-sex (further
describing his views and reasons for ceasing gender reassignment surgery at Johns Hopkins
Hospital).
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To support his position, Dr. McHugh cites a 1970s Johns Hopkins
University study — conducted while he was head of psychiatry at that
university — that found little difference in psychological health when
comparing the outcomes of transgender people who had undergone
surgery with the outcomes of those who did not.210 This study has been
criticized in that it is unverified and was not published in a peerreviewed medical journal, but rather in a religious publication.211
Further, Dr. McHugh’s reliance on the study ignores an obvious
alternative explanation: that is, because not all transgender people
suffer from gender dysphoria and desire to undergo hormone
treatment and surgery, it would make sense that, in a group of
transgender people, some of whom experienced gender dysphoria and
chose to undergo gender conformity surgery, and some of whom chose
to forego gender conformity surgery (either because they did not
experience gender dysphoria or because their dysphoria was
sufficiently treated by non-surgical methods alone), all would
experience generally similar psychological outcomes and levels of
satisfaction with their choices.212
Dr. McHugh also cites a 2011 study that revealed that “beginning
about 10 years after having the surgery, the transgendered [sic] [who
had undergone gender conformity surgery] began to experience
increasing mental difficulties. Most shockingly, their suicide mortality
rose almost 20-fold above the comparable nontransgender
population.”213 Although the results of this study are certainly
disturbing, the data may not actually be statistically significant, given
the small sample size and the fact that transgender Americans
experience more than 25-fold rates of attempted suicide compared to
non-transgender Americans.214 A 20-fold rate might actually represent
a decline for post-gender conformity surgery individuals relative to the
transgender population at large. True enough, after Dr. McHugh cited
210. McHugh, Transgender Surgery, supra note 207.
211. O’Donnabhain v. Comm’r, 134 T.C. 34, 67 n.47 (2010).
212. WORLD PROF’L ASS’N FOR TRANSGENDER HEALTH, supra note 36, at 6 (“. . . transgender,
and gender nonconforming individuals are not inherently disordered. Rather, the distress of gender
dysphoria, when present, is the concern that might be diagnosable and for which various treatment
options are available.”).
213. McHugh, Transgender Surgery, supra note 207.
214. Ann P. Haas et al., Suicide Attempts Among Transgender and Gender Non-Conforming
Adults: Findings of the National Transgender Discrimination Survey, THE WILLIAMS INST. 1, 2
(Jan. 2014), https://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/AFSP-Williams-SuicideReport-Final.pdf.
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this study, Dr. Dan Karasic, a psychiatrist and WPATH board
member, published a response that characterized Dr. McHugh’s
description of the study as a misrepresentation.215 In his response, Dr.
Karasic indicates that “the increased mortality [above the comparable
non-transgender population] is in those who had surgery before 1989,
and that mortality in trans people after 1989 is not statistically different
from the general population.”216 Dr. Karasic also points to a more
recent study by the same researcher, published in 2014, which
indicates that regret rates have been declining significantly in recent
decades:
The risk of regretting the procedure was higher if one had
been granted a new legal gender before 1990 . . . . For the
two last decades, the regret rate was 2.4% (1991–2000) and
0.3% (2001–2010), respectively. The decline in the regret
rate for the whole period 1960–2010 was significant.217
This recent study indicates that, since 1990, regret rates surrounding
gender conformity surgery have decreased dramatically, perhaps due,
in part, to advances in medical techniques. This information further
undermines the conclusions Dr. McHugh draws from the older 2011
study, which took place between 1973 and 2003.218
Finally, Dr. McHugh characterizes the treatment of transgender
and gender nonconforming children as “close to child abuse,” stating
that puberty-delaying hormones “stunt . . . children’s growth and risk
causing sterility.”219 He further implies that these risks are
unnecessary, as “close to 80% of such children would abandon their
confusion and grow naturally into adult life if untreated.”220 If these
statements accurately depicted treatment of gender nonconforming
215. Dan Karasic, Wall Street Journal Editorial Critiques Transgender Health, WORLD PROF.
ASS’N FOR TRANSGENDER HEALTH (July 2, 2014), http://www.wpath.org/site_page.cfm?pk
_association_webpage_menu=1635&pk_association_webpage=4905[https://web.archive.org/web
/20170705102125/http://www.wpath.org/site_page.cfm?pk_association_webpage_menu=1635&p
k_association_webpage=4905].
216. Id.
217. Cecilia Dhejne et al., An Analysis of All Applications for Sex Reassignment Surgery in
Sweden, 1960–2010: Prevalence, Incidence, and Regrets, 43 ARCHIVES OF SEXUAL BEHAV. 1535,
1543 (2014).
218. Cecilia Dhejne et al., Long-Term Follow-Up of Transsexual Persons Undergoing Sex
Reassignment Surgery: Cohort Study in Sweden, PLOS ONE (Feb. 22, 2011),
http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0016885.
219. McHugh, Transgender Surgery, supra note 207; McHugh, Surgical Sex, supra note 209,
at 36–37.
220. McHugh, Transgender Surgery, supra note 207.
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children, then certainly this treatment would be problematic.
However, Dr. Karasic’s response states that this is a
mischaracterization as well, writing:
As McHugh states, most gender nonconforming children do
not identify as transgender in adulthood. However, those who
receive puberty blocking drugs do not do so until puberty,
when trans identity is likely to persist. These drugs allow
adolescents and their parents to work with doctors to achieve
the best outcome. This approach was demonstrated to be
successful in research in the Netherlands before being
adopted widely in the U.S.221
Dr. Karasic concludes his response by stating that “[t]he American
Psychiatric Association and [WPATH] no longer view transgender
identity as inherently pathological. Dr. McHugh’s views are stuck in
the past.”222 The modern medical community’s thorough acceptance
of the WPATH Standards of Care implies that Dr. McHugh’s pressure
on the IRS Commissioner in 2004 was guided by his strongly-held
bias and was unsupported by verifiable studies. Further, the IRS
response in this situation indicates a potential tendency for IRS rulings
on contentious tax issues to differ depending on the current
administration’s views, rather than be guided by an impartial reading
of the tax code.
C. Overview of the Tax Court: Implications for Future Petitioners
It is worth mentioning that O’Donnabhain could have chosen to
sue the Commissioner of Revenue in either a federal district court or
in the U.S. Tax Court; her choice to sue in the U.S. Tax Court is
significant for two reasons.223 First, the Tax Court is an entity that is
independent from the IRS, the 19 members of which are presidentially
appointed.224 The Tax Court is “a court of record established by
Congress under Article I of the U.S. Constitution.”225 The Supreme
Court, in a five-four decision in 1991, explained that, in its current
incarnation, although it is not an Article III court, it is an “Article I
221. Karasic, supra note 215.
222. Id.
223. Suits Against the United States and Claims for Damages under IRC § 7433, IRS (Jan. 13,
2017), https://www.irs.gov/irm/part25/irm_25-003-003.html.
224. About the Court, U.S. TAX COURT (Aug. 2016), https://www.ustaxcourt.gov/about.htm
(hereinafter “U.S. Tax Court, About the Court”).
225. Id.
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legislative court” and “exercises a portion of the judicial power of the
United States.”226 Accordingly, Tax Court holdings apply to all
American taxpayers, and the IRS has specifically confirmed that it will
follow the decision in O’Donnabhain.227 However, most Tax Court
opinions — specifically, those denominated “memo” and “summary”
opinions — historically have “lack[ed] precedential value” even in
later Tax Court cases, and they are not binding on federal appellate
courts in any event.228 Full-court opinions like the O’Donnabhain
decision, sometimes referred to as “reviewed opinions,” do have
precedential value insofar as later Tax Court panels must follow
them.229 Yet, following traditional rules of stare decisis, neither
federal district courts nor federal courts of appeals are bound to treat
any Tax Court decision as precedent230 or even deserving of
deference.231 Hence, the Tax Court’s O’Donnabhain decision, despite
its potentially pivotal role in determining the outcomes for future tax
issues, cannot direct the decisions of federal appellate courts
concerning whether gender dysphoria constitutes a disease and, by
extension, whether gender conformity surgery and other gender
conforming treatments that alter the appearance constitute deductible
“medical care” or non-deductible “cosmetic surgery” when used to
treat a mental illness. For future taxpayers seeking to bring similar
challenges in a court bound to follow the O’Donnabhain ruling, then,
the Tax Court is their obvious choice.

226. Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 891–92 (1991) (emphasis added).
227. Thomas D. Moffitt, Action on Decision, IRB No. 2011-47, IRS (Nov. 21, 2011) available
at https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-aod/aod201103.pdf.
228. Amandeep S. Grewal, The Un-Precedented Tax Court, 101 IOWA L. REV. 2065, 2066–67
(2016).
229. Id. at 2065 n.7; Battat v. Comm’r, No. 17784-12, 2017 WL 449951, at *9 (T.C. Feb. 2,
2017) (“Tax Court opinions are subject to stare decisis.”); Smith v. Comm’r, 926 F.2d 1470, 1479
(6th Cir. 1991) (noting that the Tax Court is bound by stare decisis, but that the full court can
overrule a prior Tax Court decision, and explaining how it “know[s] of no authority which prevents
a court, sitting en banc, from overruling one of its prior decisions when it has determined that the
rule is outdated and an impediment to legal process”).
230. Carroll v. United States, 198 F. Supp. 2d 328, 357 (E.D.N.Y. 2001), vacated on other
grounds, 339 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 2003) (“[T]he decision of the Tax Court . . . would not be entitled to
stare decisis effect in this [federal district court] any more than the decision of a federal district
court sitting in Illinois would be entitled to stare decisis effect in the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit.”).
231. Maier v. Comm’r, 360 F.3d 361, 365 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Madison Recycling Assocs.
v. Comm’r, 295 F.3d 280, 285–86 (2d Cir. 2002) for the proposition that “[w]e owe no deference
to the Tax Court’s statutory interpretations, its relationship to us being that of a district court to a
court of appeals, not that of an administrative agency to a court of appeals”).
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For such taxpayers, a second factor weighing in favor of the Tax
Court is cost. The relatively low costs of the Tax Court might be
beneficial to transgender taxpayers who, as discussed above,
experience disproportionate levels of poverty. Other than a $60 filing
fee when filing the petition, there are no other court costs associated
with litigating a case before the Tax Court.232 Meanwhile, fees to bring
a case before U.S. District Courts tend to be much higher and vary by
state. For example, the U.S. District Court of Massachusetts,
O’Donnabhain’s home state, charges $195 to file a Civil Complaint or
Petition, and there may be other fees involved depending on the filings
of the petitioner.233 Perhaps more significantly for a litigant of modest
means, “[o]nce the petition is filed [in Tax Court], payment of the
underlying tax ordinarily is postponed until the case has been
decided.”234 The same is not true in federal district court, where the
taxpayer would be required to pay the tax balance before suing for a
refund. Prior to the trial date, interest continues to accrue upon the
petitioner’s unpaid tax balance, however, the petitioner can “stop the
interest accrual before going to tax court by making a payment and
labeling it as a deposit.”235
D. The U.S. Tax Court’s Decision in O’Donnabhain
For better or worse, given the foregoing considerations,
O’Donnabhain brought her case in the Tax Court and not federal
district court. The Tax Court, in an 11-5 decision, ruled in favor of
allowing deductions as “medical care” for certain of O’Donnabhain’s
treatments — her hormone therapy, gender conformity surgery, and
transportation — but disallowed deduction of the cost of her breast
augmentation surgery, ruling that the latter was excluded by the
cosmetic surgery exception to the definition of deductible medical
care. The majority opinion addressed the following issues:

232. U.S. Tax Court, About the Court, supra note 224. There are of course litigation costs, such
as attorney fees, expert witness fees, etc., but those would presumably be the same whether the
taxpayer chose the Tax Court or a federal district court.
233. Boston Municipal Court and District Court Filing Fees, MASS.GOV, http://www.mass.gov
/courts/court-info/filing-fees/dc-fees-gen.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2018).
234. U.S. Tax Court, About the Court, supra note 224.
235. Mark P. Cussen, Tax Court: Your Last Resort, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.
com/articles/tax/09/tax-court-last-resort.asp (last visited Feb. 18, 2018).
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1. Whether gender identity disorder, or GID, constituted a
“disease” for purposes of section 213 of the Internal Revenue
Code,236
2. If so, whether O’Donnabhain suffered from GID,237 and
3. If so, whether O’Donnabhain’s hormone therapy, gender
conformity surgery, and breast augmentation constitute
“treatment” of her GID, and were thus deductible medical
care expenses for purposes of section 213.238
As a threshold matter, the Court held that GID does constitute a
“disease” for purposes of section 213.239 As rationale, the Court cited
GID’s classification as a mental disorder in DSM-IV,240 “widespread
recognition of the condition in medical literature,”241 and GID’s nature
as “a serious, psychologically debilitating condition” that “poses a
serious medical need,” as recognized by “every U.S. Court of Appeals
that has ruled on the question.”242
The Court next turned to the issue whether the petitioner suffered
from the “disease” GID. It rejected the IRS’s argument that
O’Donnabhain was not correctly diagnosed with GID, holding that
O’Donnabhain’s GID diagnosis was “substantially supported by the
record.”243 Specifically, the Court cited the qualifications and opinions
of O’Donnabhain’s treating psychotherapist: Ellaborn was licensed to
diagnose GID, she had ample experience treating transgender patients,
she did, in fact, make such a diagnosis, and she gave “persuasive”
testimony regarding the methodology behind her diagnosis and the
ruling out of other conditions.244 The Court noted that Dr. Coleman,
the second licensed professional who examined O’Donnabhain,
concurred in the diagnosis and in the appropriateness of treatment
through gender conformity surgery.245 Finally, the Court cited the
concurrence of O’Donnabhain’s expert witness, Dr. George Brown,
236. O’Donnabhain v. Comm’r, 134 T.C. 34, 55 (2010).
237. Id. at 63.
238. Id. at 64.
239. Id. at 59.
240. Id. at 60.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 61–62 (referring to opinions from seven of the U.S. Courts of Appeals that “have
concluded that severe GID or transsexualism constitutes a ‘serious medical need’ for the purposes
of the Eighth Amendment” and noting that “[n]o U.S. Court of Appeals has held otherwise”).
243. Id. at 63.
244. Id.
245. Id.
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whom it acknowledged as “a recognized authority in the field.”246 The
Court ruled that the testimony of these three witnesses, all of whom
had examined O’Donnabhain, was entitled to greater weight than the
testimony of the IRS’s two expert witnesses, who had not.247
Having concluded that GID is a “disease” within the meaning of
the Internal Revenue Code’s definition of “medical care” and that
O’Donnabhain did indeed suffer from it, the Court then turned to the
issue whether the various costs that O’Donnabhain sought to deduct
qualified as payments for “treatment” or other “medical care” for GID
and were thus eligible for the medical deduction, and did not instead
fall into the exception for non-deductible “cosmetic surgery,” as the
IRS maintained. The Court held that, although O’Donnabhain’s
gender conformity surgery and hormone therapy “treated” her GID for
purposes of section 213,248 on the facts of this case, her breast
augmentation did not.249 Concerning its holding that the gender
conformity surgery and hormone therapy were deductible, the Court
cited case law and standard dictionary definitions of “treatment,” and
found that hormone therapy and gender conformity surgery were
treatments of GID under both of these definitions insofar as they both
relieved or cured its symptoms.250
The Court decided, however, that O’Donnabhain’s breast
augmentation surgery fell into the “cosmetic surgery” exception and
was not therefore a deductible medical treatment because she provided
insufficient documentation of any breast-related anxiety that would be
treated and ameliorated by augmentation.251 As the basis of its
reasoning, the majority of the Court applied the relevant statutory
language that describes the cosmetic surgery exception (that surgery
designed to “improve the patient’s appearance” is non-deductible
“cosmetic surgery” unless it meets one of three conditions, namely
that it (1) is “necessary to ameliorate a deformity arising from . . . a
congenital abnormality,” (2) “promote[s] the proper function of the
body” or (3) “prevent[s] or treat[s] illness or disease”).252 The court
ruled out the first condition on the grounds that “Petitioner has not
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 70.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 72–73.
See supra section III(B) (describing I.R.C. § 213(d)(9)).
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argued, or adduced evidence, that the breast augmentation surgery
ameliorated a deformity within the meaning of section
213(d)(9)(A).”253 It then ruled out the second condition, noting that
“the parties [had] stipulated that petitioner’s breast augmentation ‘did
not promote the proper function of her breasts.’”254
To evaluate whether the third condition applied, the Court
reviewed Dr. Meltzer’s presurgical notes and testimony, which
indicated that O’Donnabhain had developed B-cup breasts of a “very
nice shape” due to hormone therapy treatments and from which the
Court concluded that no deformity was present.255 It noted that
O’Donnabhain had produced no evidence of breast-related anxiety or
distress that the augmentation could have been justified as treating, as
required by the WPATH Standards of Care.256 The majority therefore
concluded that the third condition did not apply and that, because
O’Donnabhain’s “breast augmentation surgery meets the definition of
‘cosmetic surgery’ in section 213(d)(9)(B), it is not ‘medical care’ that
is deductible pursuant to section 213(a).”257 Several judges issued
concurring opinions, noting that they agreed with the result but not the
majority’s reasoning. In one such concurrence, Judge Halpern stated
that he generally agreed with the majority opinion, but disapproved of
the majority’s reference to the “apparent normalcy” of
O’Donnabhain’s breasts as a “superfluous and potentially misleading”
reason to deny the deduction for O’Donnabhain’s breast-augmentation
surgery.258 Rather, Judge Halpern agreed with the decision to deny the
deduction solely because of O’Donnabhain’s failure to show that her
doctors documented her “breast-engendered anxiety” in accordance
with WPATH’s Standards of Care.259 Implicitly, had O’Donnabhain
adequately documented such “breast-engendered anxiety”260 related
to her GID, then the breast augmentation would have been considered
a medical treatment to treat the illness of GID, and the deduction for
that surgery would have been allowed as well.

253. O’Donnabhain, 134 T.C. at 72.
254. Id. at 73.
255. Id. at 72–73.
256. Id. at 73. The O’Donnabhain Court refers to the WPATH Standards of Care as the
Benjamin standards, in reference to the previous name of the organization.
257. Id. at 72.
258. Id. at 77–78.
259. Id. at 77.
260. Id. at 73.
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Before ending its inquiry, however, the majority opinion
overreached in two ways, seemingly applying two tests that do not
find their source in the Internal Revenue Code. First, the Court
discussed at length the degree to which the WPATH Standards of Care
are accepted “in the psychiatric profession” and, more generally, in
the medical community at large, considering whether that acceptance
is “limited,” “broad,” “widespread,” or “substantial.”261 These
qualifiers and the requirement for any specific degree of “acceptance”
are not prescribed by section 213 of the Code, or any other section for
that matter. In fact, numerous opinions of the Tax Court have allowed
deductions for treatments that were surely less widely accepted by the
medical community than the WPATH Standards of Care. For instance,
as the O’Donnabhain majority itself pointed out, the Tax Court has
previously approved medical deductions for such non-mainstream
treatments as naturopathic and holistic cancer treatments, Navajo
healing ceremonies or “sings,” acupuncture, and Christian Science
practitioner services262 — “treatments that are highly unlikely to
survive rigorous scientific review.”263 As the Court in those matters
understood, the “deductibility of medical care payments under section
213 is not strictly limited to traditional medical procedures” but rather
“allows medical expense deductions for ‘nontraditional’ medical
care.”264 The relevant inquiry is not whether a treatment is
universally — or even widely — accepted as the best and most
appropriate treatment by the majority of traditional medical doctors.
Instead, the inquiry is simply whether the treatment fits the definition
of medical care under section 213 and is one that the taxpayer and his
medical care provider believe will aid in diagnosing, curing,
mitigating, treating or preventing a disease by, for instance, relieving
the taxpayer’s symptoms. By its lengthy examination of the degree of
acceptance of the WPATH Standards of Care, the Tax Court applied
an unnecessary and unfounded test to transgender care that it has not
applied to other treatments and forms of care; in so doing, it may have
created precedent that will help future patients obtain insurance
coverage for transition-related care. Yet the inquiry was unnecessary
261. Id. at 65–68.
262. Id. at 69 (citing Dickie v. Comm’r, 77 T.C.M. (CCH) 1916 (T.C. 1999); Crain v. Comm’r,
51 T.C.M. (CCH) 806 (1986); Tso v. Comm’r, 401 T.C.M. (CCH) 1277 (1980); Rev. Rul. 72–593,
1972–2 C.B. 180; Rev. Rul. 55–261, 1955–1 C.B. 307).
263. Id. at 91.
264. See, e.g., Dickie v. Comm’r, 77 T.C.M. (CCH) 1918.
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for the determination before the Court and should not be seen to create
an extra hurdle for a single class of taxpayers.
In another concurrence, Judge Holmes noted the danger of
politicizing the courts and inserting judges into medical debates, and
expressed concerns with the majority’s search for consensus
surrounding the Standards of Care as a means to establishing their
legitimacy as accepted medical procedures. Judge Holmes explained,
“The consensus of WPATH is not necessarily the consensus of the
entire medical community.”265 Although there is, indeed, wide
consensus surrounding WPATH’s Standards of Care, Judge Holmes
was right to point out that excess emphasis on consensus may come at
a cost to future taxpayers. Ultimately, the Court explained that
regardless of the controversy surrounding the efficacy of gender
conformity surgery and hormone therapy, case law under section 213
indicated that “complete consensus on the advisability or efficacy of a
procedure is not necessary for a deduction . . . .”266 However, the
decision to wade into the topic sets the Court on a path down a slippery
slope of questioning the treatment choices of taxpayers; those patients
with lesser-understood conditions, those who seek treatments that
have not yet achieved consensus among all health care providers, and
other marginalized patients may be unjustifiably denied a deduction.
Further, the Court applied a second, unnecessary, and unfounded
test when it considered whether the two procedures, gender
conformity surgery and hormone treatment, were medically necessary,
despite the fact that the section 213 does not require such a finding as
a precondition to deductibility. The IRS argued that “medical
necessity” was a “requirement intended by Congress to apply to
procedures directed at improving appearance.”267 The majority
opinion implicitly acknowledged that a “medical necessity”
requirement is not expressly prescribed by the Code; it stated that it
need not decide whether to infer such a requirement “notwithstanding
the absence of the phrase in the statute.”268 It explained that the
requirement “would not bar the deductions at issue, inasmuch as . . .

265.
266.
267.
268.

O’Donnabhain, 134 T.C. at 88 (Holmes, J., concurring).
Id. at 69.
Id. at 74.
Id.
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petitioner has shown that her sex reassignment surgery was medically
necessary.”269 The majority explained:
Given Dr. Brown’s expert testimony, the judgment of the
professional treating petitioner, the agreement of all three
experts [O’Donnabhain’s one expert and both of the IRS’s]
that untreated GID can result in self-mutilation and suicide,
and . . . the views of a significant segment of knowledgeable
professionals that sex reassignment surgery is medically
necessary for severe GID, the Court is persuaded that
petitioner’s sex reassignment surgery was medically
necessary.270
In his concurring opinion, Judge Holmes weighed in to criticize the
majority for unnecessarily considering whether O’Donnabhain’s
various treatments were “medically necessary,” when that requirement
is not found in the tax code.271 Judge Holmes aptly explained that it
“is not essential to the holding and drafts our Court into culture wars
in which tax lawyers have heretofore claimed noncombatant
status.”272
Just as the Court’s inquiry into the degree of acceptance of the
WPATH Standards of Care was irrelevant, so too was the Court’s
inquiry into medical necessity. Not only is the requirement not found
in the Internal Revenue Code, the phrase “medical necessity” has been
used only very rarely in prior decisions regarding the medical
deduction, in cases where the expenditure was for items barely related
to medical treatment at all. For instance, the petitioners in Garcia v.
Commissioner273 tried to deduct the cost of heating and cooling their
home and the cost of a lawn care service, and in questioning the
“medical necessity” of those expenditures, the Tax Court questioned
whether the treatments were even medical in nature, not whether those
treatments were preferred or required by the medical community for a
particular disease or condition.274 Moreover, there is no universally269. Id.
270. Id. at 76 (emphasis added).
271. Id. at 90–97 (Holmes, J., concurring). Other judges filed concurring and dissenting
opinions on related issues, but this Article does not address them.
272. Id. at 85.
273. 111 T.C.M. (CCH) 1 (T.C. 2016).
274. Id. at 17; see also Lenn v. Comm’r, 75 T.C.M. (CCH) 1892 (T.C. 1998) (disallowing legal
fees that were not necessary to obtain medical care or a legitimate a method of treatment, but rather
incurred during an effort to obtain reimbursement for private school tuition for taxpayer’s son from
a public school district).
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recognized definition of medical necessity, and even the IRS’s expert
acknowledged that “the definition of medical necessity ‘varies
according to the defining party.’”275 Significantly, the U.S. Tax Court
has found that section 213 allows deductions for medical care even
without a physician referral,276 one of the two essential prongs in
typical definitions of medical necessity in the insurance context, as
discussed above. By delving into an evaluation of medical necessity,
without first reaching a clear decision regarding the definition of
medical necessity or whether the inquiry was even appropriate, the
majority not only inserted itself into an unnecessary debate outside the
expertise of most tax judges, but it also set an example that may
introduce unintended barriers to controversial medical care in future
cases and cast the courts as ill-equipped decision-makers in the
medical arena. Depending on the defining party, medical necessity’s
definition may change — and, due to the overreach of the Court in this
case, that definition may have significant bearing over whether a
future taxpayer’s chosen medical treatment is deductible.
Significantly, this may bring additional challenges to future taxpayers
who might, as a result of this opinion, be asked to satisfy more onerous
burdens of proof to show that their chosen treatment was medically
necessary in their case, even though medical necessity is not required
by statute.
Although the Court properly held that hormone therapy and
gender conformity surgery are treatments for GID for purposes of
deduction under section 213, its inquiry should have ended there. In
sum, its decision even to entertain the respondent’s arguments
surrounding “medical necessity” and “wide acceptance” is
problematic for future decisions regarding the deductibility of other
controversial medical care since “medical necessity” and “wide
acceptance” are not thresholds that are imposed by the applicable
laws, and the decision potentially creates a hurdle for marginalized
populations not imposed on other taxpayers.277 Because medical
consensus regarding the merits and acceptance of a treatment and
determinations of medical necessity have not historically been
275. O’Donnabhain, 134 T.C. at 75.
276. See Dickie v. Comm’r 77 T.C.M. (CCH) 1916, 1918–19 (T.C. 1999) (“More importantly,
section 213 does not preclude deduction of amounts expended for medical care even though such
care was not prescribed by a medical doctor.”).
277. O’Donnabhain, 134 T.C. at 70.
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necessary to qualify those treatments as medical care, to impose
requirements of medical necessity and consensus in this case
contradicts precedent, is unjustly burdensome, and unfairly limits
patient choice in seeking affordable medical care. Those portions of
the majority opinion should instead be treated as the dicta that they
are.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
Following the Tax Court’s decision in 2010, many lauded
O’Donnabhain as the first of many policy-based changes in favor of
transgender rights.278 However, more recent actions, such as the
federal court injunction of HHS’s regulation prohibiting
discrimination on the basis of transgender status by insurers and health
providers, the commitment by HHS to reassess that regulation, the
prohibition on the CDC’s use of the term transgender, and the Trump
administration’s determination to ban military service by transgender
individuals and to ban the use of federal funds for transition-related
care for military members, putatively based at least in part on the cost
of transgender care,279 prove that the future of transgender health care
is far from certain.
Moving forward, at the next opportunity presented by an
appropriate case, the Tax Court should clarify that its inquiry into
“medical necessity” and “wide acceptance” in the O’Donnabhain case
was merely dicta and not intended to create new requirements out of
whole cloth. As discussed above, the meaning of “medically
necessary” for the purposes of health care insurance coverage can vary
between states and between insurance providers, and sometimes even
lacks an explicit definition. Notably, the Tax Court did not define this
term in its opinion, and therefore it is reasonable to assume that the
Tax Court uses the plain language definition of “necessary” for the
purposes of its analysis. Due to ambiguities in the definition of
“medical necessity”, the fact that the Internal Revenue Code does not
use the term “medical necessity”, and the general overreach of the
Court in its analysis thereof, the Court should clarify its position to
278. O’Donnabhain v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, GLAD, https://www.glad.org/
cases/in-re-rhiannon-odonnabhain/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2018).
279. Presidential Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Homeland
Security, 82 Fed. Reg. 41319 (Aug. 25, 2017) (banning transgender participation in the U.S. armed
forces).

[CORRECTED](6)51.1_YOUNGMAN (DO NOT DELETE)

2018]

3/27/2019 5:17 PM

PROTECTING TRANSGENDER HEALTH CARE

55

prevent the imposition of an unnecessary — and unfounded — hurdle
on future taxpayers. Advocates and other interested parties may want
to identify an appropriate case to bring the issue to the forefront, or to
request a revenue ruling from the IRS.
At a more fundamental level, so long as insurance coverage for
transition-related care is not universally protected from discriminatory
exclusions under state and federal law, attorneys and policy experts
must continue to support the longevity of the medical deduction within
Internal Revenue Code. In all, O’Donnabhain’s deductions, in 2017
dollars, equate to $23,715.19 (or $29,904.98 if including breast
augmentation surgery), which given the average American’s effective
tax rate of 29.8%280 would amount to a one-time savings of
approximately $7,067.13 in avoided taxes ($8,911.68 if including
breast augmentation).281 Yet the initial U.S. House of Representatives
draft of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act had proposed to repeal the medical
deduction entirely, while increasing the standard deduction to $24,400
for married couples filing jointly.282 If O’Donnabhain were to pursue
the same treatments today, assuming that she provided adequate
documentation of distress and anxiety to deduct her breast
augmentation costs, and if Congress had, in fact, eliminated the
medical deduction, O’Donnabhain would lose out on a deduction of
almost $18,000 (the $29,905 cost minus the standard $12,000
deduction, for a loss of approximately $5,364 in tax savings at a tax
rate of 29.8%283), ceteris paribus. Even without allowing a deduction
for breast augmentation surgery, O’Donnabhain’s itemized medical
deductions would still exceed the new standard deduction by almost
$12,000. While the medical deduction was not ultimately eliminated
by the 2017 tax legislation,284 the issue is sure to arise again in future
legislation. Interested parties will need to be vigilant in monitoring
proposed legislation and advocating for retaining it in the face of
future legislative threats.
280. Matthew Frankel, What’s the Average American’s Tax Rate?, MOTLEY FOOL (Mar. 4,
2017, 7:31 AM), https://www.fool.com/retirement/2017/03/04/whats-the-average-americans-taxrate.aspx.
281. CPI Inflation Calculator, BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., https://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl
(last visited Feb. 18, 2018).
282. Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, H.R. 1, 115th Cong. §§ 1308, 1002 (2017) (discussing proposed
repeal of the medical expense deduction and enhancement of the standard deduction).
283. Frankel, supra note 280 (showing that the average American’s effective tax rate, including
state/local, Federal, Social Security, and Medicare taxes, is about 29.8%).
284. Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 11027, 131 Stat. 2044.
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Transgender people are only one demographic who could face
negative externalities if future attempts to repeal the medical
deduction come to fruition. As just one example, people with
disabilities currently can use this deduction to deduct expenses
associated with specialized care, household accommodations, and
travel to and from specialist appointments. Likewise, the elderly often
use the deduction to offset costs associated with dental, eye, and longterm nursing home care not covered by Medicare. Both groups would
lose the ability to deduct such expenses, which often exceed the
proposed standard deduction. By preserving the medical deduction
now and in the future, as well as ensuring that the precedent set by
O’Donnabhain is upheld within the IRS, transgender people who seek
medical care—transition-related or otherwise—will be able to deduct
the out-of-pocket expenses associated with medical procedures that
are often denied coverage under state Medicaid services and private
health insurers.
With regard to protecting the rights of transgender people and
other members of the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender
(“LGBT”) community, there are three additional important
considerations that professionals in the legal, political, and medical
arenas must explore further. First, in order to ensure that policymakers understand fully the experiences and needs of transgender
Americans, political influencers must first ensure that policy-makers
have access to reliable data that reaches populations across the United
States. As indicated above, due to current lack of Census data related
to gender identity and transgender status, most existing data on
transgender populations relies on surveys that are often conducted by
LGBT-focused non-profit organizations.285 As described above, in
March 2017, the U.S. Census Bureau determined that there was “no
federal data need” for questions about “sexual orientation and gender
identity” on the 2020 Census,286 despite requests for the collection of
such data by “at least four federal agencies, including the Justice
Department,”287 which wrote a letter to the Census Bureau in
November 2016 to demonstrate “the legal authority supporting the
285. Wang, supra note 51.
286. Thompson, supra note 52.
287. Hansi L. Wang, Census Bureau Found No Need for LGBT Data Despite 4 Agencies
Requesting it, WGBH NEWS (July 18, 2017), https://news.wgbh.org/2017/07/18/census-bureaufound-no-need-lgbt-data-despite-4-agencies-requesting-it.

[CORRECTED](6)51.1_YOUNGMAN (DO NOT DELETE)

2018]

3/27/2019 5:17 PM

PROTECTING TRANSGENDER HEALTH CARE

57

necessity for the collection of [LGBT-related] information.”288 Until
transgender and gender-nonconforming people are recognized in the
Census and other data collection surveys, the U.S. government will
not produce large-scale, reliable data concerning the health and other
outcomes of transgender people in the United States. Continuing to
exclude such topics and questions on the 2020 Census will eliminate
opportunities to gather data on a large scale that the government and
other entities can use to implement effective policies that address
transgender and gender-nonconforming health care needs.289
Second, psychiatric groups must consider the implications of
gender dysphoria’s classification as a mental illness. Some
transgender rights advocates have voiced criticism that continued
classification of gender dysphoria as a “disease” or “mental illness”
will only perpetuate stigma surrounding the transgender and gender
nonconforming community.290 This rationale is also why the DSM-5
workgroup on gender dysphoria made the conscious decision to
remove the word “disorder” when renaming GID.291 As a parallel
example, some point to the removal of homosexuality from the DSM
as an important step in the de-stigmatization of homosexuality.292
Issues of stigmatization aside, treating gender dysphoria as a medical
disorder poses the risk of creating a “homogenous, medicalized model
of the ‘ideal’ transgender body” that inhibits access to appropriate
medical treatment for transgender people who do not fit this mold.293
As such, it is arguably problematic to continue to provide deductions
for gender conformity surgery and other treatments for gender
dysphoria as a “disease” under section 213.
Yet removing gender dysphoria from the DSM might make it
even more difficult for transgender people suffering from gender
dysphoria to obtain approval to deduct transition-related medical care.
288. Letter from Arthur E. Gary, General Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to John H. Thompson,
Director, Economics and Statistics Administration, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Nov. 4, 2016),
apps.npr.org/documents/document.html?id=3892167-DOJ-to-Census-Bureau-2016-11-04-Edit.
289. Dinan, supra note 51.
290. Katy Steinmetz, Being Transgender is Not a Mental Disorder: Study, TIME HEALTH (July
26, 2016), http://time.com/4424589/being-transgender-is-not-a-mental-disord.
291. Jack Drescher, New Diagnostic Codes Lessen Stigma for Transgender People, MEDSCAPE
(Sept. 11, 2007), https://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/885141.
292. The History of Psychiatry and Homosexuality, LGBT MENTAL HEALTH SYLLABUS,
http://www.aglp.org/gap/1_history (last visited Feb. 18, 2018).
293. Alesdair H. Ittelson, Trapped in the Wrong Phraseology: O’Donnabhain v. Commissioner,
26 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 356, 356 (Oct. 26, 2011).
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One potential solution that protects access to care while reducing
stigma might involve efforts to educate the public about the true nature
of gender dysphoria as distress associated with, but distinct from,
transgender identity. This is a question for policy-makers and medical
professionals to weigh in the years ahead. This consideration goes
hand-in-hand with the need for improved training and education of
health care professionals surrounding the needs of transgender health
care, so that transgender patients everywhere can have access to
adequate and compassionate health care.
Third, and most important, policy experts interested in protecting
transgender rights must advocate for state- and federal-level
antidiscrimination protections to prohibit discrimination on the basis
of sexual orientation and gender identity by health care providers and
insurers. As discussed above, state-level legislation that both explicitly
protects private insurer and Medicaid coverage of transition-related
medical care, in accordance with WPATH’s Standards of Care, as well
as prohibits health care and other forms of discrimination on the basis
of gender identity is necessary to ensure that transgender people are
not denied essential health care on the basis of gender identity. At the
federal level, protecting transgender health care will require keeping
and enforcing guidance such as 42 C.F.R. part 92 which, as discussed
above, has been enjoined indefinitely, despite better-reasoned prior
case law that indicates that transgender discrimination is a form of sex
discrimination. Given the current presidential administration’s lack of
support for transgender protections thus far, it is not likely that federallevel protections will effectively protect transgender patients in the
near future. Therefore, state-level protections are increasingly critical
to protecting transgender health care access; fortunately, the states are
also where demonstrable growth has occurred throughout the past
several years.294 States wishing to prevent discriminatory health care
practices will want to consider adopting their own versions of 42
C.F.R. part 92, with the religious exceptions identified by the
Franciscan Alliance, Inc. court as appropriate.
294. See Healthcare Laws and Policies, supra note 140; Healthcare Laws and Policies,
MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT (Sept. 21, 2016), http://www.lgbtmap.org/equalitymaps/healthcare_laws_and_policies[https://web.archive.org/web/20160921174545/http://www.lg
btmap.org:80/equality-maps/healthcare_laws_and_policies]; Healthcare Laws and Policies,
MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT (Oct. 7, 2017), http://www.lgbtmap.org/equalitymaps/healthcare_laws_and_policies[http://web.archive.org/web/20171004060034/http://www.lgb
tmap.org/equality-maps/healthcare_laws_and_policies].
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Overall, except for the “widely accepted” and “medically
necessary” dicta discussed above, O’Donnabhain v. Commissioner
represents a tremendous success for transgender health care rights and
offers opportunities for increasing affordable access to transitionrelated care. States and, ultimately, federal policymakers must take the
next steps to promulgate its principles into insurance regulations and
elsewhere to realize the potential of the decision.
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